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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the fundamental goals of a patent system is to encourage the research and 
development of the most socially valuable inventions—those innovations that will produce the 
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greatest benefits for society at large. If the government could determine in advance which 
inventions are most socially valuable, it could simply offer direct rewards for their development.1 
The fact that the United States has chosen to employ patents rather than direct rewards to 
encourage innovation reflects a decision to decentralize the task of picking winners. This policy 
choice is premised on the notion that, if inventors or the market are in a better position than the 
government to identify valuable innovations, the government should delegate the task by 
granting inventors a patent as a reward for innovation.2 Patents entitle inventors to monopoly 
profits from an innovation,3 and monopoly profits tend to increase as the social value of an 
innovation increases.4 Thus, the patent system generally encourages inventors to work on what 
they believe will be the most valuable inventions. 
This rationale for choosing a patent system over a reward system explains why the 
government may choose to grant patents in the first place. It does not explain, however, why the 
government sometimes takes patents away after they have been granted. These patent 
revocations are commonly triggered when the defendant in a patent infringement case 
successfully challenges the validity of the patent held by the plaintiff.5 The logic behind patent 
challenges and revocations is that the government, when implementing a patent system, might 
accidentally give out patents to entities that did not innovate or did not need a reward in order to 
innovate.6 Such invalid patents have no upside: they do not encourage innovation, and they 
impose deadweight losses on welfare. In short, patent challenges weed out invalid patents.7 
                                                 
1 See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 
534–36 (2001); see also Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 1137, 1137–38 (1998) (“Under symmetric information and full commitment, the first-best solution to 
underprovision of ideas is subsidizing research, rather than creating a new set of monopoly price distortions through 
the patent system. However, before research is conducted, the government may not know the costs and expected 
benefits of research, and may not even be able to conceive of some inventions.” (citations omitted)). 
2 Of course there are other reasons one might still prefer a reward system to a patent system. For example, a reward 
system that released the innovation into the public domain would impose less deadweight loss to welfare. The 
information advantage of inventors is a necessary but not sufficient condition to preferring patents over rewards.  
3 Shavell  & van Ypersele, supra note 1, at 529.  
4 This claims rests on the absence of any a priori reason why the fraction of social surplus extracted by a monopolist 
rises or falls with the size of that surplus. See infra section I.A. 
5 Patents can also be revoked via administrative proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office. See 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 301 –329 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
6 The likely reason for these mistakes is that the Patent and Trademark Office must make decisions about which 
applicants deserve patents with very little information about their innovation beyond that which the applicant itself 
provides. Peer review does not come until later, when profit sharing becomes a motive for an infringer to provide the 
government with more balanced information about the validity of a patent. See infra section I.B. 
7 Scholars have criticized patent law for making mistakes in weeding out socially worthless patents. The gist of the 
argument is that the criteria patent law employs to judge the validity of, say, utility patents—novelty, non-
obviousness, and utility—do not perfectly identify those innovations that improve social welfare, as an economist 
might define it. Accordingly, the argument goes, these criteria do not successfully induce valuable innovation while 
deterring socially worthless research. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6–8 (2003), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 24–
35 (2004); Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299 (2005). We 
share these concerns, but we have little to add to them and they do not affect the arguments we make later in the text 
about the problem with patent challenges and potential reforms to improve those challenges. Therefore, we proceed 
under the assumption that the law determining which patents are valid operates as a reasonable proxy for which 
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There are two problems, however, with patent challenges. In some cases they impose costs 
on valid patents, and in other cases they fail against invalid patents. These flaws stem from two 
sources. First, infringers occasionally bring challenges even when patents are valid, causing the 
holders of valid patents to bear litigation costs in responding to a patent challenge. At the same 
time, alleged infringers may fail to challenge all holders of invalid patents, allowing these patents 
to continue imposing deadweight loss. Second, occasionally courts may make an error when 
judging whether a patent is valid or invalid. This may cause the holder of what is truly a valid 
patent to lose that patent or allow an invalid patent to stand. These failures decrease the ex ante 
returns to any innovation that deserves a valid patent, undermining the incentives at the core of 
the patent system, and increase the social costs of the patent system.  
Moreover, these failures are most acute in cases involving the most socially valuable patents 
and the largest firms. Whereas the patent system seeks to decentralize the choice of innovation, 
patent litigation also decentralizes the decision to challenge a patent. Specifically, it delegates the 
decision to private parties, ideally potential entrants into the patent holder’s market. However, 
there may be few firms in a position to challenge a patent and large fixed litigation costs to filing 
a challenge. Thus challengers tend to target holders of the most profitable and (and often most 
socially valuable) patents.8 Smaller patent holders are particularly vulnerable because they 
cannot afford substantial litigation costs. By implication, challengers tend to avoid taking on 
larger firms because there is a lower likelihood of succeeding against even an invalid patent held 
by such firms.9 This discourages innovation at smaller firms and tolerates socially harmful 
patents held by larger firms. 
At bottom, the problems with patent challenges are primarily attributable to judicial and 
administrative errors. If the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) granted only valid patents, or if 
the courts could be trusted to uphold all valid patents and strike down all invalid ones, our 
system of patent challenges would function almost perfectly. Yet errors are endemic throughout 
                                                                                                                                                             
patents (and the inventions they protect) increase social welfare. We shall focus instead on errors in application of 
that law by courts.  
8 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 
613, 632 (2011). 
9 Michaxel J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1234 
(2008) (detailing numerous advantages of large firms over small firms in the use of intellectual property for profit 
and in litigation). 
  
all levels of the process. The PTO issues scores of invalid patents every year,10 and the federal 
courts are notoriously inaccurate when adjudicating patent validity.11  
If judicial and administrative inaccuracy is the disease, then improving that accuracy would 
seem the most obvious cure. Indeed, proposals to reduce the error rate within the federal courts 
and the PTO are legion and involve everything from increased funding and technical training to 
full-scale restructuring of the judicial process.12 Nonetheless, the patent system’s endemic errors 
and inaccuracies have proven notoriously resilient in the face of ongoing ameliorative efforts.13 It 
may be that there are upper limits to the level of precision that generalist judges can bring to a 
system involving such technically complex subject matters, for instance.14  
In this Article, we suggest that it might be possible to improve the value of patent challenges 
even without increasing their accuracy. Put simply, we propose raising the stakes involved in 
patent litigation. A patent owner who prevails at trial should collect enhanced rewards, above 
and beyond the damages the owner would normally be paid in compensation for the 
infringement. A patent owner whose patent is invalidated at trial should be forced to pay 
significantly enhanced penalties. At first glance, our proposal might seem entirely 
counterintuitive. If patent adjudications are riddled with errors, one would think that it would be 
preferable to lower the stakes involved, rather than increase them. Scholars and courts have 
largely confined themselves to that approach.15 
Yet contrary to the conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that enhanced rewards and 
penalties can correct many of the flaws inherent to patent challenges even without affecting the 
accuracy of the adjudications themselves. They accomplish this by restoring patent holders’ net 
expected trial outcomes to appropriate levels.16 Enhanced rewards would compensate holders of 
                                                 
10 E.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 7, at 32–33 (describing a patent granted based on the “determination that 
surrounding jam with peanut butter so the bread will not get soggy is a new idea, and one that was not previously 
obvious to skilled sandwich-makers”); Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. L. 
REV. 1495, 1495 & n.1 (2001) (“Complaints are legion.”); Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What 
To Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 10 (2005) (“Bad patents are everywhere.”); 
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption Of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 
(2007) (arguing that PTO grants “patents that should never have been issued” because of presumption of validity in 
judicial review); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589 (1999) (noting that “patents for 
‘business methods’ implemented in software . . . are of extremely poor quality”); Michael J. Meurer, Patent 
Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 676 (2009) (describing how “PTO struggles to improve 
examination quality”).  
11 See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in 
Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 258–59 (2008) (demonstrating that even sophisticated and experienced 
federal courts struggle with patent cases).  
12 We describe and critique these various proposals in section III.A, infra.  
13 See, e.g., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) 
(describing a continuing crisis within the patent system); Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace 
of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 737 (2007) (describing “a 
growing patent crisis”); see also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 258–59 (demonstrating that judges to not appear to 
improve as they gain experience with patent cases). 
14 See infra section III.A. 
15 See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
16 In a way, our proposal is related to Gary Becker’s observation that deterrence is a function of the probability of 
apprehension times the fine paid upon apprehension. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172, 180 (1968). Focusing on improving the accuracy of courts is akin to changing 
the probability of apprehension, although our proposal to raise stakes is akin to changing the criminal fine. Our 
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valid, valuable patents for the risks they run at trial. This would incentivize the optimal amount 
of research and innovation, as well as continued research on the most socially valuable 
inventions. At the same time, enhanced penalties would reduce or eliminate invalid patent 
owners’ opportunities to earn positive returns at trial, vastly diminishing their incentives to assert 
their invalid patents in the first place.17  
The enhanced rewards and penalties we propose would thus allow our imperfect patent 
system to mimic one in which courts erred less frequently. Patent owners—be they genuine 
innovators or patent trolls—and their competitors would behave as if they could rely upon the 
courts to reach the correct outcome in essentially every case. The system would generate 
substantial benefits to innovation and competition at minimal cost. Where direct efforts to 
improve judicial accuracy have failed, raising the stakes of patent cases might yet succeed. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the manner in which patents direct research 
and innovation toward the most socially valuable inventions and describes the value of patent 
challenges. Part II analyzes the problems created by patent challenges when courts err in 
assessing the validity of patents. Part III presents our proposal for enhanced rewards and 
penalties and offers a theoretical demonstration of its ability to realign research and litigation 
incentives. Part IV suggests a useful refinement that would involve tailoring the availability of 
enhanced remedies and penalties to particular industries or technical fields and examines several 
important issues surrounding the implementation and effects of our approach. 
 
I.  THE LOGIC BEHIND PATENTS AND PATENT CHALLENGES 
 
In this Part, we first examine the rationale behind the existence of patents and then the 
process by which patents are granted and revoked. 
 
A.  PATENTS AND PROPORTIONAL REWARDS 
 
The patent system is premised on the idea that an inventor’s payoff for innovation should be 
proportional to the ex post social surplus from that innovation.18 Our evidence is that the payoff 
to the inventor of possessing a patent is the monopoly profits from having the exclusive right to 
market her innovation. Monopoly profits are not special in and of themselves. Indeed, monopoly 
pricing is in general associated with deadweight loss to welfare, which is typically considered a 
cost of the patent system. However, monopoly profits have the useful feature that they roughly 
scale with the social surplus from an innovation. In other words, the patent on an innovation with 
                                                                                                                                                             
proposal is also related, though less directly, to Keith Hylton’s observation that the enforcer’s dilemma that 
plaintiffs face can be overcome by type II errors by courts. In other words, plaintiffs can be encouraged to litigate by 
courts who accidentally rule for them. See Keith L. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 
J. L., ECON. & ORG. 433, 434 (1990). We make an opposite point: court (and PTO) errors in favor of patent holders 
can be overcome by increasing the penalties that invalid patent holders pay when their patent is invalidated. 
17 Our proposal resembles, but is distinct from, the English Rule, which requires that the losing party in a civil 
litigation compensate the prevailing party for its direct litigation costs. First, our remedy allows an increase in 
damages that substantially exceed the cost of litigation. Second, we advocate disconnecting the amount that the 
prevailing party received from the amount that the losing party pays. For example, we advocate giving prevailing 
patent holders patent extensions, though those patent extensions would not be paid for by infringers. See infra 
section III.D.  
18 By ex post social surplus we mean the consumer plus producer surplus from an invention after it is developed. 
This surplus excludes the cost of research required to develop the invention. 
  
twice the social value of another will typically generate twice the monopoly profits of the other. 
The reason is that, of the factors that determine monopoly profits (the level of demand, the slope 
of demand, the ability to price discriminate, and competition from other patents), only the level 
of demand must a priori scale with social value.19 There is no theoretical reason why the other 
factors are correlated with the ex post social surplus from an invention.  
The reason why the patent system seeks to scale rewards with ex post social surplus is not 
primarily that this scaling is, in general, the optimal strategy for encouraging innovation. It is 
easy enough to see that, for example, if there are diminishing returns to rewards or increasing 
cost to the use of rewards, then rewards should be roughly concave in the ex post surplus from an 
innovation.20 Rewards in turn may have diminishing returns because individuals have 
diminishing marginal utility of income and thus inventors exert less incremental effort as reward 
rises.21 And the cost of rewards may be increasing if there are fixed costs to entering a patent 
race, so that multiple inventors only compete when the reward is large enough to cover their 
fixed costs.  
Rather, the main reason why the patent system provides rewards that are proportional to ex 
post social surplus from an innovation is that the government does not know which innovations 
actually enhance social welfare. The system functions under the assumption that potential 
inventors and the market have better knowledge about the value of their invention. To encourage 
inventors to exert most of their effort on developing innovations that are socially productive, the 
system uses the incentive of a reward that scales with ex post social surplus.22 In other words, the 
proportional reward from patents is the solution to a principal–agent problem in which the 
                                                 
19 For a definition of consumer surplus and its relationship to both the demand curve and social welfare, see Daniel 
T. Slesnick, Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 2108, 2110–13 (1998). 
20 We can demonstrate this with a simple model similar to that employed by Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 1, 
at 530–32. Suppose the probability of generating an invention is  where  is the reward for an innovation,  is 
the social value from an invention,  is the cost of providing a reward. Costs might include the costs of a patent 
race or simply the costs of administering a patent system. The social welfare accounting for the reward is 
. The level of reward that maximizes social welfare satisfies the condition , that 
is, the marginal benefits of rewards must equal their marginal costs. Because rewards  and social value  are 
complements, i.e., , and the upper bound on rewards, , obviously increases with , 
the optimal reward is increasing in the social value of the innovation by Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem. Donald M. 
Topkis, Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice, 26 OPERATIONS RES. 305, 317 (1978). Moreover, it is 
easily verified that, unless  and  are linear or the upper bound on rewards is binding, the optimal reward is 
nonlinear. 
21 This concern vanishes if innovations are created by firms which are held by diversified shareholders and thus do 
not experience diminishing marginal utility of income. Of course, some innovations are made by individuals or 
privately held firms with limited shareholders. And even in large corporations, agency problems between managers 
and shareholders can mimic the results from diminishing marginal utility of income. This is most evident when the 
chief executive is paid a fraction of profits; because the chief executive experiences diminishing returns and controls 
the corporation, the corporation will behave as if it has diminishing returns. See also JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 42 (1988). 
22 The reward also incorporates the cost of research and development. 
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principal is the government and the agent is an inventor. The agent has private information on 
which project yields the greatest surplus. The government incentivizes the agent to choose the 
project that is most valuable by giving her a fixed portion of surplus from the project she chooses 
(and completes).  
To illustrate this point, consider a principal–agent model where the agent may work on either 
of two projects, 0 or 1. Due to time constraints, the agent cannot work on both. The cost to the 
agent of working on either project is the same, , and her reservation wage is normalized to 0. If 
executed, projects have payoffs of  and , respectively, where  takes a value 
of 1 or -1 with equal probability. Suppose that both principal and agent know the payoff to 
project 0, but only the agent knows the value of  before any project is undertaken, that is,  is 
common knowledge but the agent has private information on .23 The payoff to the principal is 
, where  is an indicator for whether the agent chose project 1 and  is a 
wage that may depend on information available to the principal, namely, the value of project 0 
and whether the agent works on project 0 or 1. We assume a risk-neutral agent who obtains a 
payoff of  if she works on either project and 0, her reservation wage, if she does 
not. It is easy to verify that the principal’s optimal strategy is to sell the choice between projects 
(as well as the return to the projects) to the agent for a cost of  and the agent will accept 
because . This equilibrium also coincides with the first best because the agent is 
risk neutral.24 For our purposes, the result shows that when the agent has private information on 
the value of projects, she should be incentivized to choose the right one by giving a wage equal 
to payoff from the projects, even if the cost of research and development are the same for both 
projects.25 
 
B.  PATENTABILITY STANDARDS, PATENT APPLICATIONS, AND PATENT CHALLENGES 
 
                                                 
23 The principal may not know the payoff to project 1 either because the payoff goes to some other third party the 
principal cares about or because it is realized well after a wage must be paid to the agent. 
24 If the agent is risk averse and the principal did not observe , it would still be the optimal strategy for the principal 
to offer to sell the choice and payoffs to the agent for . However, because the agent suffers a utility loss from the 
random variable , this strategy is not first best. The principal will not sell for less than  to provide the agent with 
some compensating insurance because the principal would do better by simply offering the agent a small positive 
wage (lower than the contemplated price discount) to work on project 0 and no wage to work on project 1.  
25 If the agent were risk averse and the principal received a noisy but informative signal about , the optimal contract 
would be proportional to (monotonic in) the signal, and thus to , which proxies for social surplus. There is no a 
priori reason why the contract would be concave or convex in that signal. 
  
The above rationale for the patent system assumes, first, that innovations do not occur 
without rewards and, second, that patents end up in the hands of people who develop 
innovations. Neither assumption is appropriate in all cases. Some innovations emerge without 
explicit rewards, or at least without rewards from the government.26 Prominent examples include 
academic medical research,27 freeware software, 28 and fashion innovations.29 Moreover, parties 
who have developed an innovation may not be able to demonstrate that they did so and parties 
who did not develop an innovation have an incentive to claim they did to obtain market power. If 
parties innovate in the midst of competition, they may accidentally release the innovation in the 
public domain before filing the paperwork required to secure patent rights over the innovation.30 
On the flip side, there are frequent complaints about “patent trolls” or “non-practicing entities” 
(NPEs) who either patent ideas that require little research or purchase patents based on others’ 
research, then do not make any risky investment to develop those patented ideas.31 Instead, 
critics contend, an NPE waits until some other party takes the expense and risk to commercialize 
these ideas and, if the other party is successful, files an infringement suit to extract a portion of 
the latter’s profits.32  
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ziv Shafir, Who Chooses Open-Source Software?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 139 (2011) 
(describing the intersection of academic research and open source software); Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: 
Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1504–07 (1997) (discussing the history 
of freeware and its philosophical opposition to traditional intellectual property rights). 
27 Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical Issues in the Patenting of Medical 
Procedures, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341, 349 (1998) (rejecting “the argument that the patenting of medical processes 
is necessary to enable and promote [medical] procedural advances” and arguing that decades of medical 
advancement occurred “despite the absence of medical process patents”); Wendy W. Yang, Note, Patent Policy and 
Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory Exclusion from Patentability, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 5 par. 17 
(1995) (arguing that the inherent incentives of the scientific community can supplant “economic incentive[s] 
provided by patent monopolies”). 
28 See Heffan, supra note 26, at 1504–07. 
29 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion 
Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2006).  
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (patent is invalid if the invention was published or in public use 
more than one year before the patent application was filed). In March 2012, the provisions of the America Invents 
Act amending § 102 section come into effect, generally replacing the one-year provision with a bar of public 
disclosure or use at any time before the patent’s effective filing date, subject to certain exceptions. See Pub. L. No. 
112-29, §3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).  
In the pharmaceutical industry, the problem of innovators being unable to secure patent rights is particularly acute. 
Pharmaceutical development involves both discovery of a molecule and demonstration that it is effective at treating 
humans in clinical trial. Patents are granted, however, after discovery and before the trials. Moreover, a single 
molecule may have multiple medical applications, not all evident when the molecule was discovery. If the idea for a 
particular application lags substantially behind the discovery, the molecule may enter the public domain (become 
generic) before the particular application is demonstrated. In other words, the innovative but belated application 
cannot be protected by patent rights. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 503, 519–21 (2009).  
31 See, e.g., John R. Allison et. al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 
691–95 (2011) (detailing the practices of “patent trolls” and their litigation habits). 
32 See Walter O. Alomar-Jiménez, Harmonizing Ebay, 1 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 17, 24 (2010) (explaining that the modus 
operandis of patent trolls is “not invest[ing] in research and development (R&D) to create their inventions,” 
purchasing patents “cheaply,” monitoring the “technology field of his acquired patents,” suing “defendant-
infringer[s],” and “demanding a licensing fee”); Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent 
Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 407 
(2007) (“Instead of commercializing products, patent trolls buy up patents (oftentimes older paper patents), wait for 
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A well-functioning patent system must have a way to ensure that patents are not granted 
when they are either unnecessary or undeserved. The U.S. patent system, like many others 
around the world,33 solves these problems in two complementary ways. First, it sets up criteria to 
judge when an innovation deserves a patent. Specifically, the creation must be novel, non-
obvious, and have some utility.34 These doctrines, particularly the requirements of novelty and 
non-obviousness,35 are meant to determine whether an invention has actually contributed any 
new knowledge to the world.36 The patent system then relies upon inventors’ incentives in the 
marketplace to ensure that the invention is socially valuable. If the invention has no value, there 
will be no market for it and no reason to invest resources in creating it in the first place. If the 
invention is valuable and non-obvious, then the inventor has presumably contributed some 
valuable knowledge, and with it some social surplus. Patent law’s doctrines thus provide 
reasonable standards for judging when a patent is unnecessary or undeserved—at least when they 
function correctly.37 
Second, the patent system applies these criteria at two different points during the lifecycle of 
an innovation.38 Before a product is commercialized,39 an inventor may apply for a patent with 
                                                                                                                                                             
the technology and industry to grow up around the patent, and then use the patent as a holdup device for extorting 
money from would-be defendants wishing to avoid the exorbitant costs of defending against an overreaching 
broadly claimed invention.”). 
33 For a description of the European patent system, see generally Patrick Coyle, Note, Uniform Patent Litigation in 
the European Union: An Analysis of the Viability of Recent Proposals Aimed at Unifying the European Patent 
Litigation System, 11 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 171 (2012). For comparisons of the United States, European, 
and Japanese patent systems, see generally John R. Thomas, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier: 
Comparative Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 277, 282–88 (1996). 
34 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
35 Utility only plays a meaningful role at the patent-granting stage for biotechnology and chemistry patents. See Dan 
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1644–46 (2003) (“In the last several 
decades . . . the utility requirement has lost much of its force. . . .The only exceptions are biology and chemistry.”). 
Even then, it mainly serves to prevent a firm from patenting a compound (or genetic sequence) at too early a stage. 
The judgment is that it would be a mistake to allow one firm to lock up a compound before they have any real use 
for it, removing it from the public domain as a subject for study. But even here the utility hurdle is not all that high. 
Demonstrated in vitro effects are enough to overcome it. In vivo effects on mice are also enough. See also In re 
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1995). (“Even chemical similarity to other effective compounds is enough 
36 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to “promote the progress of science and useful arts, 
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries”). 
37 Of course some scholars question whether the standards for patentability perfectly correlate with the necessity and 
deservedness of patents. We addressed this point in note 7, supra.  
38 See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 746–49 (2012). 
39 Inventors file patent applications prior to commercialization for two basic reasons. First, once a product is 
commercialized, the PTO might find that it is no longer novel. See Richard H. Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited to 
New Technology, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1229, 1249 (1986) (“The subject matter of a patent must be novel, [that is] . . . 
not disclosed in any prior publication or commercial product . . . .”). Thus commercialization may preclude a 
successful patent application. Noel Courage, Sharing the (Genetic) Wealth, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 123, 123–24 (2000) 
(reviewing KRISHNA R. DRONAMRAJU, BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY SHARING (1998)) 
(“[S]cientifically novel inventions are not patentable [when] . . . the invention was publicly disclosed prior to filing a 
patent application. Inventions lacking legal novelty are barred from patent protection . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
Second, without a patent, the inventor will face competition during the commercialization process. This may reduce 
the returns to commercialization. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of 
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1648 (2011) (“A patent on a nascent technology . . . can give the patentee ‘an 
incentive to make investments to maximize the value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will 
 
  
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The office has been criticized, however, for granting too 
many patent applications.40 One reason is limited resources. The PTO’s review is relatively 
cursory because it receives a very large number of applications but is short-staffed.41 In addition, 
the PTO only has the information provided by the patent applicant and whatever limited 
information the patent examiner is able to discover on her own.42 Another reason is poor 
incentives. PTO examiners lack the incentives to conduct extensive searches for prior art, and 
their searches are notoriously less complete and successful than the searches performed by 
opposing parties in the course of litigation.43 
Moreover, the PTO has a stronger incentive to accept applications than reject them. If the 
agency accepts the patent application, it is unlikely any party will directly complain about the 
PTO’s decision. The work typically has not been marketed and competitors have not emerged. 
By the time a competitor does emerge, the validity of the patent will have shifted from the 
jurisdiction of the PTO to that of the federal courts (typically the Federal Circuit), where the 
matter will likely arise as an infringement action against the competitor. However, if the patent 
application is rejected, the applicant has an incentive immediately to appeal the PTO’s decision. 
The PTO, seeking to avoid the cost of appeals and the shame of reversal, errs on the side of 
granting applications.44  
Patentability criteria (novelty, value, non-obviousness) may be applied a second time after 
the patent has been granted. A typical case is where a competitor emerges with a product similar 
to that described in a patent and the patent holder files a lawsuit alleging patent infringement. In 
order for a patent to have value when asserted against a competitor, it must of course be both 
valid and infringed. Therefore, as a defense, the competitor may assert that the plaintiff’s patent 
is, in fact, invalid.45 If the court agrees, the plaintiff’s patent is effectively revoked. This is the 
                                                                                                                                                             
produce unpatentable information appropriable by competitors’ . . . .” (quoting Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977)); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property 
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 709–10 (2001) (describing the effects of competition 
in the commercialization process and noting the additional costs borne by the innovating party due to competition).  
40 See supra note 10. However, it is possibly that this lax screening is socially optimal. See infra Part III; see also 
Lemley, supra note 10, at 1495 n.1.  
41 Lemley, supra note 10, at 1499–1500.  
42 Id. at 1500. 
43 Merges, supra note 10, at 603 (describing patent examiner incentives); Kristen Dietly, Note, Lightening the Load: 
Whether the Burden of Proof for Overcoming A Patent’s Presumption of Validity Should Be Lowered, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2615, 2655–56 (2010) (discussing the weaknesses of PTO examinations and arguing against the 
presumption of deference to the PTO). 
44 Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011). 
45 As we will reiterate below, we need not define a patent challenge to require an assertion that a patent is invalid. 
When an infringement suit is filed, the alleged infringer will simultaneously assert that the patent is invalid and, if 
valid, not infringed. A patent challenge can equally take the form of an argument that the competing product does 
not infringe the patent. A finding of non-infringement, however, may not always be as damaging to patent holders as 
a finding of invalidity. After all, the patent holder can always assert the patent against some other party. But in many 
cases the two have the same functional effect and the same stakes. For instance, “patent trolls” often  sue multiple 
defendants—any firm that might be infringing their patents—simultaneously. Matthew Fawcett & Jeremiah Chan, 
March of the Trolls: Footsteps Getting Louder, 13 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 18–19 (2008); but see 35 U.S.C. § 299 
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (curbing this practice for lawsuits adjudicated after the passage of the America Invents Act). 
Part of the reason patent holders bring suit against every conceivable infringer simultaneously is that sequential 
lawsuits raise the probability of the patent being invalidated in one suit and thus rendered unusable in future 
lawsuits. In such a suit, a general finding of non-infringement has the same effect as a finding of invalidity. In 
addition, a court’s interpretation of a patent’s claims is often simultaneously determinative of both validity and 
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canonical example of what we call a “patent challenge” by a private party, in this case a 
competitor.46 
This is not the only way a patent challenge can play out. A firm that wishes to challenge a 
patent can pursue a number of different options, including filing a declaratory judgment action 
before getting sued for infringement. Alternatively, in the pharmaceutical sector, the challenging 
firm need not even market a product in order to infringe on a patent. All that is required is the 
filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to obtain Food and Drug 
Administration approval to market a generic version of a previously approved “branded” drug. 
Under the Hatch–Waxman Act, the application alone constitutes grounds for the maker of the 
branded drug to assert a patent infringement claim.47  
The primary rationale for revisiting a patent grant in this manner is that, for the reasons 
described above, the PTO grants many patents that are either unnecessary or undeserved. This 
rationale does not, however, explain why the PTO delegates the authority to trigger a patent 
challenge to private parties rather than simply revisiting its own decision after some time.48 In 
some sense the delegation is consistent with the move by the patent system to decentralize the 
decision of innovations by allowing inventors to apply for patents rather than offering rewards 
for innovations chosen by the government. But decentralization by itself is not a virtue.  
A better justification is that allowing another private party to challenge a patent addresses the 
ex parte nature of the PTO approval process.49 Private parties often have better information about 
which patents are invalid and stronger incentives to search for relevant information and litigate 
vigorously. Accordingly, a patent challenge is typically brought by a private party that wishes to 
market a good similar to that described in the patent. Such a party will only exist if the patented 
work has positive economic value and will litigate only if the patent imposes an economic cost 
on them. This reduces the risk that court resources will be wasted on screening zero-cost patents. 
                                                                                                                                                             
infringement. The two doctrines thus function frequently as substitutes: if the court interprets the claims broadly, the 
patent is invalid, and if it interprets them narrowly the patent is not infringed. Accordingly, we will treat these two 
doctrines largely as substitutes for purposes of the discussion that follows. 
46 We hasten to add that we mean no normative judgment in describing these suits as “challenges.” Firms assert a 
great number of invalid patents every year; they also very commonly attempt to interpret their own patents overly 
broadly in order to capture as much productive economic conduct as possible. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, 
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1765–70 (2009); Ian 
Lampl, Establishing Rules for Resolving Markman Failures, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1025, 1038–39 (2005). In these 
instances, patent challenges are highly socially valuable. 
47 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Under the Hatch–Waxman Act, the generic drug maker must 
demonstrate that its drug is bioequivalent to the branded drug and certify that it does not infringe on the branded 
drug’s patent before it can obtain the approval of the Food and Drug Administration to market its product through 
the ANDA process. As a reward for encouraging generic drug entry, the statute gives the first generic maker to file 
for entry into a market 180 days during which it exclusively may compete against the branded drug. This incentive 
encourages generic companies to file for entry before the branded drug’s patent naturally expires (twenty years after 
it is granted). Once the generic files an ANDA, the branded company has forty-five days to file an infringement suit. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2006); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 1553, 1560–61 (2006) (summarizing generic entry under Hatch–
Waxman). 
48 The PTO could also restrict its review to patents with positive economic value by only reviewing patents that pay 
their maintenance fee. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) & (c) (2006). If a patent has zero value, it is unlikely that the holder 
will pay the maintenance fee.  
49 For a discussion of the ex parte nature of patent examination, see Lemley, supra note 10, at 1524–25.  
  
These arguments are similar to the theoretical arguments given for case-or-controversy and 
standing requirements that define who may litigate cases generally.50  
 
II.  THE FLAWS OF PATENT CHALLENGES 
 
Although patent challenges may be necessary to weed out some invalid patents, they have 
two important flaws. First, they sometimes result in valid patents being invalidated (“false 
negatives”), thereby discouraging innovation. Second, they sometimes fail against even invalid 
patents (“false positives”), thereby allowing such patents to continue imposing costs on 
innovators and consumers. We address these false negative and false positive problems in turn. 
We pause to note that here and elsewhere, we use the words “valid” and “invalid” to mean 
“valid and infringed” and “invalid or not infringed,” respectively. Both infringement and validity 
are, of course, necessary requirements before a patent holder is entitled to damages or a licensing 
fee. We describe these patents as valid and invalid largely as a matter of shorthand, but also to 
highlight the importance of the validity decision to the value of the patent and the rights of the 
patent owner going forward. A judgment of non-infringement may frustrate a patent owner in a 
single case but the patent might still be worthwhile against other infringers, whereas a judgment 
of invalidity ends the patent’s useful life.51 Likewise, a patent challenger who obtains a judgment 
of non-infringement may or may not aid other potential challengers, while one who succeeds in 
invalidating a patent has provided a public good that advantages similarly situated parties. 
 
A.  CHALLENGES AGAINST VALID PATENTS 
 
When the owners of valid patents are forced into court, the consequences can be severe. At 
minimum, such parties will be forced to pay litigation costs to defend against validity challenges. 
More significantly, federal courts may mistakenly invalidate truly valid patents. Not only are the 
costs of litigation and the risks of improper invalidation significant, they can also exert a 
differential impact on some of the most important and vulnerable patent holders. First, patent 
challengers tend to target the most profitable patents, imposing costs disproportionately on the 
most socially valuable innovations. Second, patent challengers also tend to target the smallest 
patent holders to maximize their chance of victory. These tendencies diminish the fraction of 
social surplus from an innovation that the patent holder captures, especially for the most valuable 
innovations and the smallest innovators. This outcome is inconsistent with the basic premise of 
the patent system, which is designed to allow inventors to capture a greater percentage of the 
profits from their inventions as a means of inducing innovation. It thus tends to undermine the 
value of the system. 
 
1.  Mistaken Challenges and Invalidation 
 
                                                 
50 See Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing: Privilege, System Justification, and the Predictable 
Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119, 131 (2011) (“One classic defense of standing doctrine relies 
on the . . . argument that the standing requirements are necessary to ensure that the judicial process is controlled by 
plaintiffs with a sufficient stake in the litigation.”). 
51 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (holding that once a court has 
declared a patent invalid, the patent holder is estopped from asserting that the patent is valid as against parties not 
involved in the original lawsuit). 
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Delegation of patent challenges to private parties has some benefits: better knowledge about 
the costs of bad patents, better incentives to produce information on patents, and economizing on 
court resources. But even well-intentioned private parties are not perfect. They may accidentally 
challenge patent holders that have truly valid patents. A rough indicator of this—if one assumes 
that courts make no errors—is that courts validate roughly 55% of patents that are challenged.52 
On its face this suggests that the holders of over half of challenged patents must pay litigation 
costs even though the patents are valid, eating into the deserved payoff.53 
Of course, courts may accidentally validate truly invalid patents, implying that the 55% 
validation rate is an overestimate of the errors that challengers make when initiating suit. But, by 
the same token, courts may accidentally invalidate truly valid patents, suggesting that the 45% 
invalidation rate may include cases where valid patent holders were both incorrectly targeted by 
challengers and were incorrectly found to hold invalid patents by courts.54 These valid patent 
holders do not simply pay litigation costs; they also lose all future value from their patents. Thus, 
incorrect court decisions impose even larger costs than correct court decisions from the 
perspective of valid patent holders. 
Why do we suspect that courts might mistakenly invalidate patents when the popular 
sentiment in recent scholarship is to bemoan the patent system’s lax standards for patenting?55 
Many of the arguments for why courts may accidentally validate invalid patents are also 
arguments for why they might invalidate valid patents.56 For example, several scholars criticize 
the Federal Circuit, which handles the bulk of appeals in patent litigation cases, for promulgating 
weak standards for patentability.57 Others have noted the wide variation in validation rates across 
industries,58 circuits,59 and, within jurisdictions, by whether cases are tried to the bench or to a 
                                                 
52 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 
205 (1998). At the same time, only 25% of patents in lawsuits are found valid and infringed, which indicates that a 
somewhat higher percentage of patent challenges have merit. Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 
2–3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1895681. 
53 The low number of patent trials (roughly one hundred per year) may mask a high number of valid patents that paid 
a cost due to challengers’ targeting errors. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1501. Approximately 85% of all patent 
cases settle before trial. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 271 (2006). 
54 If courts made no mistakes and patent challengers had perfect foresight, no holder of a valid patent would ever be 
sued. We can reject this scenario, however, because it cannot explain why 55% of patents are validated. 
55 See supra note 10. 
56 Another reason is that patent law’s standards for judging whether innovations deserve patents—novelty, non-
obviousness, patentability—and the doctrines that complement them may not be the best correlates of whether a 
patent is necessary to obtain an innovation and whether that innovation has positive social value. See our caveat in 
note 7, supra. 
57 See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and 
Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–69 (2000) (criticizing the formulation 
of the written description requirement); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111–12 (2004) (finding that the Federal 
Circuit has been only mildly successful in promulgating a coherent and predictable doctrine of claim construction); 
David O. Taylor, Clear but Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit’s Invalidity Standard, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 293, 295–96 (2011). 
58 Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 221–23 (finding variation in validation rates across industries). Incidentally, 
litigation rates also vary by industry. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 477–78 (2003). 
59 Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 192 (citing Gloria K. Koenig, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND 
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS (rev. ed. 1980)). 
  
jury.60 This may reflect not just randomness in litigation but variation in underlying patentability 
standards.61 Most concerning may be that prior appellate reversals and job tenure do not improve 
the performance of district courts judges in patent cases as measured by subsequent appellate 
reversals.62 Thus, judges do not appear to learn how to better apply the law. Each of these flaws 
could translate to mistakes with either invalid or valid patents.  
Whatever the cause, imposing the risk of litigation and mistaken invalidation on valid patents 
reduces the fraction of social surplus that an inventor obtains through a patent. This results in a 
weakening of the incentive the patent system employs to get inventors to work on the most 
socially valuable patents.63 
 
2. Disproportionate Impacts on the Most Valuable Patents 
 
One of the theoretical benefits of delegating patent challenges is that it economizes on court 
resources. A challenger should not challenge a patent with zero economic value because the 
market opened by the challenge is unlikely to have value to the challenger and litigation has 
positive costs. Unless litigation costs are positive but very small, however, this economizing can 
go too far. If litigation has high marginal costs or large fixed costs, patent challengers will only 
go after patents that are sufficiently profitable to cover their litigation costs. If it costs $10 
million for a firm to pursue a patent challenge,64 then its profits after successful litigation have to 
be at least $10 million to warrant the challenge. Because profits after the introduction of a 
competitor are lower than profits under a monopoly, the patent holder (which had a monopoly) 
must lose more than $10 million in payoff from the patent.  
The problem is compounded if there are fewer competitors in a position to challenge a patent 
holder than there are patents. In that case, the challengers, if behaving optimally, will go after the 
most valuable patents, not just the patents that—once invalidated—offer a payoff sufficient to 
cover the cost of litigation. To illustrate, suppose that there are two patents that could be 
challenged, one that provides $30 million in profits for its patent holder and the other that 
provides $60 million in profits to its patent holder, but only one firm that has the ability to 
challenge these two patents. Suppose also that market-wide profits after entry of a competitor are 
two-thirds the previous profits of the patent holder. This implies that successfully challenging the 
                                                 
60 Id. at 212 (finding that juries are more likely to validate patents). 
61 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1185 (2002) 
(suggesting the non-obviousness standard might be stated in a manner that is harder for software patents to meet 
than for biotech patents to meet). 
62 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 258–59 (finding neither evidence that district court judges learn from prior appeals of 
their rulings nor a significant relationship between judicial experience and performance). Of course, it is possible 
that appellate review in the Federal Circuit is effectively random. 
63 But see Sawicki, supra note 38, at 766 (citing Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1251–52 (2004)) (noting that the disincentive effects of mistaken invalidations depends on 
the efficacy of non-patent mechanisms—such as trade secrets—that inventors can use to appropriate the social 
surplus from their inventions). 
64 This is not an atypical expenditure. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 187 (suggesting that $1 million is a 
low estimate of litigation costs); see also Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J. L. & ECON. 
463, 470–71 (1995) (reviewing evidence that, while $3.7 billion was spent on basic research in 1991, $1 billion was 
spent on direct litigation costs, and that indirect costs of patent litigation for public firms averaged $20 million per 
case).  
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$30 million patent yields revenue of $10 million65 for the challenger and challenging the $60 
million patent yields the challenger $20 million.66 If the challenger can only challenge one of 
these patents, it will choose the higher valued patent. Thus the holder of the higher value patent 
will face greater litigation risks than the holder of the lower value patent.  
Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that challengers target the most valuable patents. 
For example, generic drug companies tend to infringe on patents that protect markets with the 
highest sales revenues.67 As a result, blockbuster drugs have experienced significant reductions 
in their effective patent life in recent years.68 Whereas the median loss to a drug patent holder 
from a successful challenge is roughly $400 million,69 the average loss to such a firm is roughly 
$1 billion in firm value. This indicates a strong rightward skew in losses. We can think of no 
reason why patterns of litigation would differ in other industries.70 
The result is that delegating challenges to private parties not only reduces the share of social 
surplus that patent holders appropriate from their innovation but also reduces that share 
disproportionately for the highest value patents. In other words, the nature of private challenges 
is such that it disincentivizes the most valuable innovations the most, directly undermining the 
justification for employing the patent system over one that employs government rewards. 
 
3.  Disproportionate Impacts on Smaller Firms 
 
Challenges also disproportionately discourage innovations by smaller firms. Commercially 
successful firms are not the only entities that obtain and hold valuable patents, and thus they are 
not the only ones to become targets when they innovate productively. Smaller firms—startup 
companies and the like—also frequently see their valuable patents attacked, and because the 
firms are less well-equipped to defend themselves the attacks can be all the more pernicious.  
These assaults take two typical forms. First, rather than license or purchase valuable IP from 
smaller entities, large firms often simply attempt to engineer around it.71 For instance, imagine 
that Small Startup has designed a valuable new semiconductor chip. It does not possess the 
necessary manufacturing capability to actually produce the chip, but it hopes to license the 
technology to a firm such as Intel. If Intel believes that Small Startup’s patent is weak, or that 
Small Startup will not have the resources to successfully prosecute a suit for patent infringement, 
                                                 
65 30 × (2/3) × (1/2) = 10. The one-half is because we assume that the two firms split any profits equally. 
66 60 × (2/3) × (1/2) = 20. 
67 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in 
Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 336 (2012); Laura E. Panattoni, The Effect of Paragraph IV Decisions 
and Generic Entry Before Patent Expiration on Brand Pharmaceutical Firms, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 126 (2011).  
68 Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 
28 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 491, 497 (2007). Although Hemphill and Sampat, supra note 67, at 3–4, claim 
this is because blockbuster drugs use lower quality patents to extend their patent life (so called “evergreening” 
strategies), their argument fails to explain why Grabowski and Kyle find that the total market exclusivity period for 
higher-sale new-molecular entities (NME) is lower, whether measured by mean or median, than that for lower sale 
NMEs.  
69 Indeed, this value is larger than the average cost of R&D up to the point of market approval. Joseph A. DiMasi et 
al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 154 fig. 1 (2003). 
70 Indeed, challenging a patent may be easier in the drug industry than in other industries because the Hatch–
Waxman Act gives the first generic firm to file an ANDA 180 days of market exclusivity against other generic 
entry. See supra note 47. 
71 John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 544 (2010). 
  
Intel could elect to engineer around the patent rather than licensing it. It could simply begin 
manufacturing a very similar technology with only minor, cosmetic alterations, gambling that it 
will be able to convince a court that it has not infringed. The more that firms like Small Startup 
fear this outcome, the less incentive they will have to innovate and enter markets occupied by 
large incumbents in the first place. 
This is not to say that all instances of engineering around a patent are cases in which the 
patent holder is not receiving a fair return on its invention; to the contrary, many patent holders 
deserve only narrow patents that are relatively easy to design around. However, there are many 
instances in which a small firm has in fact introduced a new and useful innovation that a larger 
entity intends to copy. In these cases, a poorly drafted patent, or simply the application of 
significant litigation resources,72 can allow the larger firm to avoid paying for the technology it is 
borrowing.73  
This possibility is exacerbated by the resource differential between the two entities. If the fair 
market value for a startup’s patent (or portfolio of patents) is in the tens or even hundreds of 
millions of dollars, a larger firm might think nothing of spending a few million dollars to defeat 
it or engineer around it.74 In theory, the startup should be able to use its patent to obtain the 
capital necessary to defend the patent. In practice, however, that is often impossible—capital 
constraints can make a battle with a larger firm very difficult for a startup to win.75 And if a large 
company can pay its engineers $3 million to find a way around a patent it would otherwise 
license for $10 million, it will often do so. The patent is still worth something—the large firm is 
paying millions to evade it—but the startup is not capturing any of that value. 
This is not to say that designing around a patent is always or necessarily a bad thing. Ideally, 
patents would possess clear boundaries.76 A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to the 
virtues of narrow patents that do not claim excessively broad inventive scopes.77 The point is not 
that every patent holder should be entitled to capture rents from a wide swath of following 
inventions. Rather, we have in mind situations in which a firm is only trying to patent the 
invention it has already created, but its patent leaves open the possibility that a competitor will 
find some way to circumvent the intellectual property right. The competitor is still borrowing the 
key idea—the “point of novelty”78—but has managed to evade the patent. When large firms 
                                                 
72 Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1227 (2008) 
(“Anticompetitive IP lawsuits may succeed because the small firm defendant lacks the information to prove 
noninfringement or invalidity. Other defendants may settle to avoid litigation costs even though they are confident 
the plaintiff would lose the lawsuit.”). 
73 Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1086 (2008) 
(“The rational would-be infringer, when confronted with a patent held by an individual inventor or a small company 
with limited resources, would likely be more willing to engage in infringing behavior, calculating that the risk of 
enforcement is lower.”). 
74 See Golden, supra note 71, at 544 (describing the incentives to design around patents rather than license them). 
75 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and 
Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 405 (2002) (“Additionally, even if adequate funds 
exist to obtain patent protection sufficient capital must exist to enforce patent rights against infringers. . . . This 
enables accused infringers to aggressively exploit the limited funds available to a patent owner.”). 
76 Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 560 (2010). 
77 See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New 
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1955 (2005) (arguing that broad patents may be used 
for anticompetitive behavior). 
78 See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Point of Novelty, 105 N.W. U. L. REV (2011). 
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adopt this approach in lieu of purchasing or licensing the patent, it diminishes the incentives for 
startups to innovate in the first instance. 
The second type of assault on small firms with valuable patents is more direct. In many 
cases, larger firms will threaten to sue small startups with their own (large) patent portfolios as a 
means of forcing the startup to license its IP on favorable terms.79 Imagine two firms operating in 
the same market: a large firm L and a small startup S. Suppose S invents and patents a new, 
valuable device that will compete with L’s products. If L has a large patent portfolio, it can 
threaten to sue S for infringement even if S’s new device would not actually infringe L’s patents. 
The very threat of suit—not to mention actual scorched-earth litigation—can be enough to 
hamper S’s ability to attract investors and bring its product to market; venture capitalists and 
banks will be wary of investing in a firm with the threat of litigation hanging over its head.80 
Accordingly, L can force S to license its patent to L on favorable terms in exchange for cross-
licenses to L’s patents (which S does not necessarily need). L then becomes S’s competitor, 
despite S’s original patent. This practice has become known as “patent bullying,”81 and it can 
diminish the value of innovations made by small startups (to those startups) if they do not have 
the resources or the patent portfolios to defend themselves. 
These two practices—engineering around and patent bullying—bend the reward curve 
downward for small firms that successfully innovate. And as with the mechanisms we described 
in section II.A.2, the more valuable a firm’s innovation, the more pronounced this effect will be. 
More valuable inventions are more valuable targets to competitors; larger firms will be willing to 
invest greater resources in engineering around a valuable innovation or threatening the startup 
that created it. Worse still, threats by large competitors will scare away capital and commercial 
partners from small firms, depriving them the resources they require to fight back on more equal 
terms. The result will be a diminution of rewards to small firms for successful innovation below 
the socially optimal level, and consequently a reduction in these firms’ innovative efforts. 
 
B.  CHALLENGES AGAINST INVALID PATENTS 
 
In some cases, challenges go too far, raising costs on valid patents and discouraging 
innovation. In other cases, however, they do not go far enough: the PTO grants an unnecessary 
or undeserved patent and a court nonetheless upholds it. In such cases, an invalid patent 
continues to generate significant economic costs without the compensating benefit of 
encouraging innovation. The failure of private parties to challenge all invalid patents is not a 
direct cost of challenges as much as a failure to fully accomplish the institutional objective of 
challenges.  
                                                 
79 See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 73, at 1068 (noting that “some companies use patents to bully their 
competitors in order to drive up their costs, to gain access to their technology, or to push them out of the market”). 
80 See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-
Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1587–88 (2009) (“The strategic use of patent litigation by established 
companies to impose distress on their financially disadvantaged rivals has been called patent predation. Such 
litigation can damage a defendant’s credit rating, its relationship with customers, and its reputation with investors, 
regardless of how the suit is ultimately resolved.”). 
81 See id. at 1588; Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting By Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 125–27 (2010) (explaining that “it may be that incumbents can strategically 
exploit weak patents to prevent competition from potential entrants”). 
  
The reasons why patent challenges underperform mirror the reasons why they sometimes go 
too far. Either private parties fail to challenge an invalid patent or courts incorrectly uphold such 
patents when challenged. Moreover, the failure of private parties can often be attributed to their 
inclination to challenge only the most profitable patients, because they offer larger rewards if 
successful, or the smallest patent holders, because they are most easily defeated in court. We 
address these points in turn. 
 
1.  Insufficient Challenges and Validations 
 
Just as private parties lack the complete information required to avoid challenging valid 
patents, they also may lack the information required to challenge all invalid patents. It is 
difficult, however, to quantify the extent to which private parties fail to challenge invalid patents. 
In general, one only observes challenges that are actually filed. Situations in which invalid 
patents are not challenged are “censored” to scholars.  
The second and more important source of leakage with challenges is that, even if an invalid 
patent is challenged, a court might mistakenly validate it. As previously noted, scholars have 
criticized the Federal Circuit for weak standards of patentability, courts in general for varying 
degrees of fluency with patent cases, and judges for failing to learn from experience.82 The 55% 
overall court-validation-rate provides some information on the rate at which courts mistakenly 
validate invalid patents. It is likely that this 55% contains at least some truly valid patents; 
therefore, this is probably an upper bound on the rate of incorrect validations by courts. In 
addition, challengers might settle cases rather than litigating them fully, depriving the public of 
the value of the patent challenge. And here, too, there is likely a disproportionate impact on 
smaller firms, which are more likely to lack the resources for scorched-earth litigation and thus 
more likely to settle earlier. 
When an invalid patent is never challenged—or, worse, when it is validated by a court—it 
imposes several types of costs on consumers and other firms. First, if the patent is protecting a 
commercial good, those goods will continue to be sold at monopoly prices, creating deadweight 
losses for consumers who cannot afford them.83 Second, when a court incorrectly finds that an 
invalid patent is valid and infringed by another inventor, the second (true) inventor must pay 
damages to the holder of the invalid patent. This functions as a tax on genuine innovation, paid 
by true innovators to holders of invalid property rights. The result will be a diminution of 
incentives to innovate on account of this tax. And third, success with invalid patents will cause 
firms to invest money in acquiring, asserting, and litigating those patents. They will hire lawyers, 
demand licensing and settlement fees, and litigate at substantial cost.84 If the patents underlying 
these activities are invalid and socially worthless, then licensing and litigating them will generate 
no social value either—they represent pure rent-seeking. The more that courts err and validate 
invalid patents, the more that they will encourage the wasting of resources on these socially 
worthless activities. 
 
                                                 
82 See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
83 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 768 (2002) 
(explaining the problem of monopolies in the context of patents). 
84 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 (2003) (estimating that patent 
litigation with between $1 million and $25 million at stake costs each side $2 million). 
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2.  Disproportionate Impacts 
 
The tendency of patent challenges to target the most profitable patents may exacerbate the 
cost of challenges when an underlying patent is truly valid, but it is a positive attribute of 
challenges when the underlying patent is truly invalid. The most profitable patents are the ones 
that generate the most deadweight loss because monopoly and oligopoly pricing models suggest 
that deadweight loss is proportional to monopoly or oligopoly profits.85 If the underlying patent 
is invalid, this larger deadweight loss is not offset by a larger incentive to innovate, as it might be 
with valid patents.86 Thus, the tendency of challenges to seek out the more profitable invalid 
patents implies that costly challenges are being appropriately rationed to patents with the largest 
social cost. 
The glass-half-empty view, however, is that the propensity to challenge more profitable 
patents implies fewer challenges against less profitable patents. Yet even less profitable invalid 
patents impose deadweight loss. It would improve social welfare if there were more challenges 
and these challenges targeted the less profitable patents, so long as the social costs from those 
invalid patents are greater than the cost of litigation against those patents. It is unlikely that all 
such challenges are occurring because the gains to a private party from challenging such a patent 
may be less than the deadweight loss from that patent. If the patent challenger wins, competitors 
other than the challenger may enter the market, lowering profits of the challenger below the level 
of the deadweight loss. It is this concern that explains why, for example, the Hatch–Waxman Act 
grants the first generic producer to challenge a drug patent 180 days of market exclusivity (as 
against other generic producers) if the generic producer prevails in its challenge.87 
Finally, a corollary of the claim that challengers focus on the valid patents of smaller firms is 
that challengers tend to avoid challenges against invalid patents held by large firms. These large 
firms can credibly threaten large litigation costs to discourage challengers and sustain invalid 
patents. Large firms can often extract more rent from any given intellectual property right than 
smaller firms because, for example, they have greater market share and more information about 
consumers. 
 
III.  ENHANCED PATENT REMEDIES 
 
In the preceding Parts, we described the manner in which patent challenges can result in what 
amount to taxes on valuable innovation or subsidies for the assertion of invalid patents. In 
particular, these taxes often fall most heavily upon the innovations that are most valuable and on 
smaller firms. We suggested that the inevitable result of such taxes and subsidies will be to 
diminish incentives to innovate for the most productive inventors and to encourage rent 
extraction by non-innovative firms.  
Here, we offer a counterintuitive solution to this problem: raise the stakes of patent lawsuits. 
Patent holders who manage to prevail against challengers should receive enhanced rewards—
                                                 
85 See TIROLE, supra note 21, at 56.  
86 Again, we are operating under the assumption that legally valid patents are economically valuable in the sense that 
they encourage innovation. Other scholars have challenged the value of modern patent standards and thus this 
assumption. We do not dispute their claims. However, we have nothing to add to them and these claims do not 
undermine our claim that patent challenges are problematic even if legal standards of patentability are largely 
efficiency promoting. See supra note 7. 
87 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2006). 
  
heightened damages or extensions of their patent terms—while patent holders who lose at trial 
should be penalized for suing on the basis of invalid patents. This approach might seem 
misguided on its face. If courts are liable to err in patent lawsuits, the more appropriate response 
would seem to be to reduce the impact of those lawsuits. Scholars have suggested such 
reforms,88 and in recent years courts appear to have taken steps in this direction.89 
Yet as we will demonstrate below, increasing the stakes of patent litigation can have 
tremendously beneficial effects on private firms’ incentives. Firms with valid, valuable patents 
will realize greater profits on those patents, providing them with additional incentives to innovate 
and correcting for the costs imposed by improper patent challenges. Firms with invalid patents 
will face steep penalties if they lose at trial. Those penalties will in turn dissuade them from 
filing suit in the first place and diminish their ability to extract licensing and settlement fees. The 
result will be a patent system that comes closer to rewarding genuine innovators but not the 
holders of socially worthless property rights. 
 
A.  CANONICAL SOLUTIONS 
 
The problems we have described in the preceding Parts all center around judicial error.90 In 
the face of such problems, commentators have typically suggested the most straightforward 
solution: invest in accuracy. Proposals for making courts more accurate abound.91 However, 
there are well-documented practical and theoretical impediments to this solution. Courts, 
particularly courts staffed by generalist judges, will always struggle with highly technical patent 
cases.92 The judicial process and the limitations it imposes upon gathering outside information 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175, 202 (2011) 
(suggesting that the doctrine of accession, which transfers ownership of property to an individual who increases its 
value and compensates the prior owner, be applied to patent law to limit injunctive relief and the amount of damages 
available); Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case for a Limited 
Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579, 584 (2005) (suggesting “a limited 
compulsory licensing scheme”); Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and 
Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 177 (2009) (exploring the possibility of damage 
caps in patent law). 
89 See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (adopting a conservative approach to granting 
permanent injunctions against parties found to be infringing a patent); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 
649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (establishing a higher, clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for 
invoking the defense of inequitable conduct, which if established invalidates the entire patent). 
90 For a nice review of the relationship between court errors and optimal tort rules, see Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 
Errors and the Functioning of Tort Liability, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 165, 167 (2005). An important distinction 
between Dari-Mattiaci’s analysis and ours is that the former examines, in the tort context, how court errors in 
determining due care and the magnitude of damages, and the relationship between the two, affect precautions, while 
we examine how errors in determining patent validity (liability) can be overcome by intentionally multiplying 
damages.  
91 E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 804 (2008) (“Another idea would be to abolish the Federal Circuit and reconstitute it as a 
trial court.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1102 (2003) (“I discuss whether the best solution would involve abolishing the Federal 
Circuit, and having a system of specialized trial courts reviewed by generalist appellate courts.”). 
92 Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 307–09 (2011) (discussing the relevant level of 
expertise among federal judges with patent law); see also Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures 120 YALE 
L.J. 2, 20–25 (2010) (describing courts’ view of their own institutional role). 
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and accessing expertise will also impede judicial accuracy.93 This is not to say that there is no 
value to investing in greater judicial accuracy; such investments may well be worthwhile. But 
they are no panacea. 
If there are limits to judicial accuracy, perhaps the government could instead invest in 
accuracy at the Patent and Trademark Office. The patent literature is rife with calls for improving 
accuracy at the PTO and suggestions for achieving that goal.94 However, even if this were 
possible, it would not eliminate the costs involved with patent challenges. Holders of valuable, 
valid patents might still bear costs as those patents were challenged in court. The necessary 
second step would be to eliminate post-grant validity challenges entirely, whether in federal 
court, before the PTO, or elsewhere. Once a patent had been issued by the PTO, it would be 
considered per se valid and not subject to question in any future proceeding. The elimination of 
post-grant challenges could be coupled with enhanced review at the PTO, with additional 
resources devoted to screening out invalid patents before they were ever issued. In theory, then, 
the costs of patent challenges would be borne most heavily by parties with questionable or 
invalid patents, not successful innovators. 
Yet there are serious problems with this option. The first is that the examination performed 
by the PTO may never be terribly efficient or effective at weeding out bad patents because PTO 
examiners have misaligned incentives.95 As we explained above, they have no incentive to 
conduct thorough searches of prior art and, even if they did, they would still have greater 
incentives to grant, rather than reject, patent applications.96 Moreover, even if it were possible to 
correct these incentive problems, it would be tremendously costly to conduct a thorough search 
of the prior art on each and every patent filed each year.97 There are simply too many patent 
applications, and too many of them are economically insignificant and will never be litigated or 
licensed.98 As inefficient as patent challenges may be, conducting a full-scale examination of 
every patent would be even worse. Lastly, in many cases the owners of valuable patents are 
frustrated not by rulings that their patents are invalid, but instead by rulings that they are not 
infringed by important competitors.99 Banning challenges to a patent’s validity could hardly 
solve this problem, and there is no correlative solution to the problems caused by non-
infringement. Most importantly, if the patent system is generally functioning correctly, it makes 
little sense to entirely prohibit a set of challenges which will be welfare-enhancing more often 
than not. Such a remedy is overbroad. 
                                                 
93 See Masur, supra note 92, at 310–11 (discussing the procedural limitations of courts). 
94 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology 
at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L J. 729 (2006); Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What 
Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 (2004). There 
have been legislative attempts as well. See, e.g., America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284 et seq. (2011) (creating several 
mechanisms for post-grant review and reexamination).  
95 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 7, at 136 (describing the incentives facing patent examiners); cf. John Bronsteen, 
Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 540–41 (2007) (noting that judges’ preferences for leisure 
time will incline them to grant more motions for summary judgment than would otherwise be appropriate). One 
study found that patent approval rates spike in September—the month in which the PTO’s accounting year closes 
and examiners are awarded bonuses for processed applications. Gajan Retnasaba, Why It Is Easier To Get a Patent 
in September? (May 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1121132. 
96 See supra section I.B. 
97 Lemley, supra note 10, at 1495 & n.1. 
98 Id. 
99 See supra Part I. 
  
A more moderate alternative would be to imbue patents that have been granted by the PTO 
with a heavy presumption of validity, diminishing the number of incorrect invalidity 
determinations in the federal courts. Patents are currently presumed valid when granted, and 
clear-and-convincing evidence is required before they can be found invalid.100 This presumption 
might be strengthened further, to the point where (for instance) a patent could only be invalidated 
if no reasonable person could find it valid. Some scholars have suggested that the law should 
move in the opposite direction, toward eliminating the presumption of validity on the basis of the 
PTO’s manifest failings in patent examination,101 but change now appears very unlikely as the 
Supreme Court recently affirmed the existing standard.102 Heightening the standard for invalidity 
would have many of the same advantages and flaws as simply eliminating challenges entirely, 
though those effects would be more muted. Absent any reason to believe that such an 
intermediate solution would decrease the costs of eliminating validity challenges more than it 
would the benefits, it strikes us as no more advisable than a complete ban. 
 
B.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: ENHANCED REWARDS AND PENALTIES 
 
The issue that we have identified is partly the result of erroneous decisions to challenge or 
not to challenge a patent, and erroneous judicial decisions to uphold an invalid patent or strike 
down a valid patent. If we cannot easily reduce the probability that a valuable patent will be 
erroneously defeated at trial, the second-best alternative might be to increase the rewards to 
holders of valuable patents who prevail at trial. So long as courts are more likely than not to 
uphold a valid patent, the effect would be the same: to increase the valid patent holder’s net 
expected trial outcome. Similarly, if we cannot easily reduce the probability that an invalid 
patent will be erroneously validated at trial, the second-best alternative might be to impose 
additional penalties against the holders of patents who fail at trial. So long as courts are more 
likely than not to strike down an invalid patent, this would reduce the invalid patent holder’s net 
expected trial outcome. 
We thus suggest raising the stakes in patent cases. Our basic idea is simple. If a patent holder 
sues and wins, the court should award enhanced damages above and beyond the normal measure 
of damages. If a patent holder sues and loses, the court should assess a substantial monetary 
penalty against the patent holder. This may seem counterintuitive—if patent lawsuits are not 
perfectly accurate, it would seem to make little sense to increase the costs involved in errors. Yet 
so long as courts are better than a coin flip at identifying a patent as valid or invalid, a system of 
properly designed, supplemental rewards and penalties could simultaneously (1) eliminate the 
downward pressure on innovative incentives caused by errors within the patent system; and (2) 
dissuade holders of bad patents from filing suit in the first instance. Most importantly, such a 
system would tend to benefit holders of valid, valuable patents, and diminish incentives to 
acquire and assert invalid patents. 
How would such a system function? Our idea is to apply standard theories of compensation 
drawn from tort law.103 Consider first holders of valid, valuable patents. The purpose behind 
                                                 
100 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
101 See Lichtman &. Lemley, supra note 10. 
102 Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2243, 2252. 
103 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–214 (7th ed. 2007) (describing standard economic 
theories of tort law). 
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enhanced rewards is to compensate those owners for the risk that their patents will be improperly 
invalidated and thus counteract the downward bending of the reward curve for the most valuable 
inventions. What is the cost of that risk? Suppose that a typical valid, valuable patent has a 
probability  of being erroneously invalidated (or erroneously found not infringed) in litigation. 
Suppose further that litigation imposes a fixed cost of  on the patent holder. The cost of 
litigation to a patent holder is , where  is the value of the patent (to its owner) per year 
and  is the number of useful years of patent life lost to the patent owner.104 The  term 
represents the risk of early invalidation.105  
The calculation for losing patent owners is quite similar. Suppose that the owner of an invalid 
patent sues a genuine innovator for infringement. Suppose the probability that the court errs and 
upholds an invalid patent is , the same as the probability that the court strikes down an valid 
patent.106 The accused infringer will bear litigation costs of . It will also face expected damages 
of . The potential cost to the innovator is therefore . As in tort law, the way to deter 
the holder of an invalid patent from imposing such costs on blameless innovators is to force the 
losing patent owner to internalize the costs of her own lawsuit, namely .  
A problem that arises is that, just as a court cannot perfectly identify whether a patent is valid 
or invalid, it cannot perfectly identify which parties deserve compensation for exposure to 
litigation and those which should be penalized for imposing litigation risks. All courts know is 
                                                 
104 In the interests of simplicity, the model in the text assumes that a patent has constant value over time and does 
not include discounting. A more general formulation of the costs of litigation to the patent holder is  where  
is the net present value of the patent over the period during which the patent was infringed but calculated as of the 
date the suit was resolved in favor of the patent holder. In later sections we relax some of these simplifying 
assumptions. 
105 These years of patent life would include both the years remaining on the patent term—if the patent is valuable 
over those years—and any earlier years in which the patent was infringed. That is, suppose Generic Firm B begins 
infringing Pharmaceutical Firm A’s patent eleven years into that patent’s twenty-year life. Firm A sues Firm B for 
infringement, and seven years later (in the eighteenth year of the patent term) prevails before a jury. Firm A would 
be entitled to supplemental damages based on nine years of patent life. Those nine years represent the period of 
valuable patent life that was effectively at risk during the lawsuit. 
106 It would be easy to generalize and assume the probability of upholding an invalid patent is . On the 
assumption that current rules of patentability are correct, we have no reason to suspect one type of error is more 
likely than the other. Some scholars assert that patent law has too low standards of patentability, see supra note 7. 
This would suggest a greater likelihood of upholding an invalid patent. Because the thesis of this paper—using 
enhanced penalties to address flaws in patent challenges—does not depend on the specific underlying rates of error, 
we proceed under the assumption that error probabilities are symmetric, i.e., , in order to simplify our 
exposition. 
  
whether they upheld or struck down a patent. Therefore, any compensation or penalties imposed 
after patent litigation must be conditioned on verdicts. In doing so, the court must account for the 
fact that a patent that is upheld may not be valid and a patent that is struck down may not be 
invalid. This implies that the optimal compensation for a patent that has been upheld is 
 
	
	
 
where  is the probability that a patent is valid given that it was upheld by the 
court, and  is the probability that a patent is actually invalid even though it 
was upheld by the court. That is, the additional compensation provided to a winning patent 
holder must be reduced to account for the probability that the court erred and the patent was not 
actually valid. Similarly, the optimal penalty for a patent that has been struck down at trial is 
 
	
	
 
where  is the probability that a patent is actually valid even though it 
was struck down by the court, and  is the probability that a patent is 
invalid given that it was struck down by the court. As with enhanced rewards, because judicial 
verdicts are imperfect, the penalty must be reduced to account for the possibility that the court 
erred in striking it down. 
To calculate the optimal transfers and penalties, we need to estimate how informative court 
judgments are. To do this, we can use Bayes’s Theorem: 
 
		
where  is the probability that a patent will be upheld given that it is valid, 
which is equal to ;  is the probability that a patent will be upheld 
given that it is invalid; and  and  are the probabilities that a patent 
selected at random will be valid or invalid, respectively. If we assume that 
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,107 then Bayes’s Rule suggests that simplifies to 
. Because a patent must either be valid or invalid, this also implies 
that . Using the same approach, we can estimate the probabilities that a 
patent is valid or invalid if it is struck down. By Bayes’s Rule, 
 
 
 
where  is the probability that a patent will be struck down given that 
it is invalid, which is equal to ;  is the probability that a patent will 
be struck down given that it is valid, which is equal to p; and  and  are the 
probabilities that a patent selected at random will be valid or invalid, respectively. As before, if 
we assume that ,  simplifies to 
. Again by negative implication, . 
If we plug these values into the equations for optimal compensation, we will find that the 
optimal reward for a patent upheld at trial is 
 
	
 
Likewise, the optimal penalty for a patent struck down at trial is  
 
		
The  discount reflects the lack of confidence that court verdicts identify truly valid and 
invalid patents.	
In order for this system of enhanced rewards and penalties to have the desired incentive 
effects, patent holders and challengers must of course have some sense of whether the patent at 
                                                 
107 This is equivalent to assuming that 50% of patents asserted in litigation are invalid or not infringed. This may 
overstate the true percentage of asserted patents that are valid and infringed. See supra note 52. Regardless, we set 
 only to simplify the mathematics here. The formula will generate correct answers so 
long as the true values are plugged in. 
  
issue is valid and infringed or not. If the parties are entirely mistaken as to the validity of the 
patent, enhanced rewards and penalties will only skew their behavior even further. However, as 
we will demonstrate at the end of this section, very little accuracy is actually required of patent 
holders and challengers. So long as litigants are better than a coin flip at determining what sort of 
patent is involved, the system of enhanced rewards and penalties will improve litigation 
incentives. 
In order to illustrate the effects of these enhanced rewards and penalties, consider a simple 
numerical example. Suppose that the typical patent litigation costs $10 million, and the error rate 
in the typical case is 20%. (It will of course be impossible to determine the error rate in a 
particular case—doing so would be tantamount to determining the outcome with perfect 
certainty. Courts will necessarily rely instead upon the typical error rate across cases.)108 
Suppose further that pharmaceutical Firm A holds a patent that is worth $10 million per year and 
has seven years of patent life remaining. That patent is being infringed by generic drug Firm B. 
Firm A stands to collect $70 million (the value of damages and an injunction) from Firm B if it 
prevails at trial.109 Under current rules, if Firm A were to prevail, its gain would be: 
 
$70	million	in	damages	–	$10	million	in	litigation	costs	ൌ	$60	million.	
	
If Firm A were defeated, it would pay: 
 
$10	million	in	litigation	costs.	
 
Under our proposed system of enhanced rewards and benefits, if Firm A prevailed, it would 
collect: 
	
$70	million	in	damages	–	$10	million	in	litigation	costs	൅	ሺ$10	million	൅	$70	
million	ൈ	0.2ሻ	ൈ	ሺ1	–	0.4ሻ	in	enhanced	rewards	ൌ	$74.4	million.	
 
If Firm A lost at trial, it would be forced to pay: 
	
$10	million	in	litigation	costs	൅	ሺ$10	million	൅	$70	million	ൈ	0.2ሻ	ൈ	ሺ1	–	0.4	
in	penaltiesൌ	$24.4	million.	
	
Now consider the effects that these enhanced rewards and penalties will have upon litigant 
behavior. Imagine that Firm A has a valid, valuable patent, one based upon legitimate research 
and covering a socially valuable invention. Suppose that Firm A has a 75% chance of prevailing 
against Firm B at trial. Under current law, Firm A’s expected payoff from litigating is: 
	
                                                 
108 We discuss in detail below the issues of how this error rate might be calculated and what actor or institution 
might be best equipped and positioned to calculate it. 
109 It will not necessarily always be the case that the value of the patent to its owner is equivalent to the damages that 
will be assessed against the defendant in the event that the patent owner prevails at trial. It will depend upon a 
number of factors, including the effect that the entrance of the infringer into the market will have on the patent 
holder’s super-competitive profits. Yet the exact numbers are irrelevant. The system of enhanced rewards and 
penalties we describe will function similarly irrespective of the precise numerical values involved. We employ 
similar numbers here only to simplify the mathematics.  
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ሺ$60	million	net	ൈ	0.75ሻ	–	ሺ$10	million	ൈ	0.25ሻ	ൌ	$42.5	million.	
 
With enhanced rewards and penalties, Firm A’s expected payoff is: 
 
ሺ$74.4	million	net	ൈ	0.75ሻ	–	ሺ$24.4	million	ൈ	0.25ሻ	ൌ	$49.7	million.	
 
As is evident from the calculations above, the enhanced rewards that Firm A receives when it 
succeeds at trial more than balance out the penalties it would be forced to pay if it fails. This is 
because Firm A has a strong patent, one that is more likely than not to be found valid and 
infringed. The result is that Firm A will be almost fully compensated for the risk it runs that its 
patent will be found invalid each time it is forced to litigate. Firm A’s reward curve will be bent 
back upward, and its incentives to pursue the most socially valuable inventions will be largely 
restored. 
Suppose that Firm A instead owns a worthless, invalid patent, one that it should not be 
asserting against genuine innovators. Nonetheless, because of the possibility of judicial error, 
there is a 20% chance that Firm A’s patent will be found valid and infringed at trial. Under 
current law, Firm A’s expected payoff from litigating is: 
	
ሺ$60	million	net	ൈ	0.2ሻ	–	ሺ$10	million	ൈ	0.8ሻ	ൌ	$4	million.	
 
With enhanced rewards and penalties, Firm A’s expected payoff from litigating is: 
 
ሺ$74.4	million	ൈ	0.2ሻ	–	ሺ$24.4	million	ൈ	0.8ሻ	ൌ	–	$4.64	million.	
	
 
The addition of enhanced rewards and penalties thus transforms Firm A’s decision to litigate 
this weak patent from a reasonable gamble with a positive payoff into a losing proposition.110 
This will have feedback effects on Firm A’s other uses of the patent. Firm A will not be able to 
extract substantial concessions during licensing negotiations or settlement if it stands to lose 
money if it proceeds to trial. This is exactly as it should be: we are better off if this patent is 
never so much as mentioned in a threatening letter, much less asserted at trial. 
The analytic discussion that began this section set forth the optimal measure of enhanced 
rewards and penalties. And the numerical example that followed was of course just one example. 
But it is crucial to note that enhanced rewards and penalties will improve trial outcomes for 
owners of valuable patents and harm trial outcomes for owners of invalid patents any time that 
courts and litigants are more accurate than flipping coins. That is, if courts reach the right 
outcome at trial more than 50% of the time, and litigants know whether they have a valid or 
invalid patent with at least 50% accuracy, and the enhanced reward or penalty is greater than 
zero, then the system we describe will benefit holders of valid patents and harm holders of 
                                                 
110 If the probability of error is larger, for example, , then it is possible that a patent holder should receive a 
reward even if its patent is struck down. The reason is that the ideal reward for a valid patent holder is much larger 
than the ideal penalty on an invalid patent holder. Even a slight increase in the error rate increases the probability 
that a verdict striking down a patent is ensnaring a valid patent holder and thus increases the proper transfer, perhaps 
making it net positive. 
  
invalid ones.111 It is not necessary that private parties have any informational advantages over 
courts (though it would be helpful). Nor is it necessary that the two parties have asymmetric (or 
symmetric) beliefs or information. The mechanism of enhanced rewards and penalties will 
function properly so long as each actor is more accurate than a coin flip. It is thus robust to an 
extremely wide range of parameters. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following extreme numerical example. Suppose courts 
are 51% accurate at determining whether a patent is valid or invalid; parties are similarly 51% 
accurate at determining the validity of the patent at suit; and enhanced rewards and penalties are 
set at $1,000. The holder of a valid patent will likely receive an enhanced trial award of: 
 
$1000 ൈ	0.51	–	$1000	ൈ	0.49	ൌ	$20.	
	
The	holder	of	an	invalid	patent	will	likely	be	assessed	a	penalty	of:	
	
$1000 ൈ	0.51	–	$1000	ൈ	0.49	ൌ	$20.	
	
Suppose that a patent owner owns a valid and valuable patent but only knows this with 51% 
probability. The patent owner will anticipate an enhanced payoff of: 
 
$20 ൈ	0.51	–	$20	ൈ	0.49	ൌ	$0.40.	
	
In symmetric fashion, an owner of an invalid patent would anticipate an enhanced penalty of 
–$0.40. The high degree of inaccuracy depresses the impact of the enhanced rewards and 
penalties. But the principle nonetheless holds: firms with valuable patents will be compensated in 
part for their litigation risk, while firms with valueless patents will be punished for threatening 
suit. 
By consequence, firms with valid, valuable patents will be even more likely to file suit; firms 
with invalid, socially worthless patents will be less likely to file suit or assert those patents 
against genuine innovators. Most importantly, this mechanism will function without any gains in 
accuracy by the courts or the PTO. Private parties will adjust simply as a matter of their own 
incentives and their perceived likelihood of success. The result will be fewer lawsuits based upon 
invalid patents and greater rewards for owners of valid, valuable intellectual property rights. 
 
C.  WHO PAYS WHOM? 
 
The discussion thus far has been directed toward properly setting the patent holder’s 
incentives. The goal is to reward holders of valuable patents in order to incentivize further 
research and development, while simultaneously dissuading owners of worthless patents from 
filing suit. We have not yet addressed the question of who should pay for patent owners’ 
enhanced rewards and who should be paid when patent owners are assessed enhanced penalties. 
We take up those questions in this section, and again we reach a counterintuitive conclusion: the 
                                                 
111 If courts are less than 50% accurate—that is, worse than a coin flip—then it makes no sense to have courts 
deciding patent cases in the first place.  If the courts cannot be improved, we would be better off abolishing them 
and flipping coins.  We cannot prove that courts are better than a coin flip, but we suspect (or at least hope) that this 
is the case. 
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structure of payments should not be symmetric. Successful patent challengers should be paid by 
the patent holders who litigated against them; but victorious patent holders should be paid by the 
public, rather than the patent challenger who has been found to infringe. This is contrary to the 
norm in American civil litigation that, aside from the costs of litigation, damages paid by the 
defendant are equal to the damages received by the plaintiff.112 
 
1.  Victorious Patent Owner 
 
When a patent owner in possession of a valuable property right prevails at trial, it would 
seem obvious at first blush that the patent challenger should be forced to pay for the enhanced 
rewards. After all, it is the challenger who has created the costs in the first instance. However, 
this might inhibit valuable challenges to bad patents as well—a losing infringer could face very 
substantial liability under this rule. Challengers to bad patents are providing public goods: if they 
invalidate a socially harmful property right, a broad spectrum of innovators will reap the 
benefits.113 When a court invalidates a patent, it benefits the consumers of the underlying product 
as well as all competing firms that might wish to enter the relevant market—not just the firm that 
prevailed in the lawsuit.114 As a result, a patent challenger only internalizes a small fraction of 
the benefits of a successful suit. There will be many instances in which it would be socially 
productive if a patent were challenged but not privately worthwhile for any individual firm, and 
the challenge will not take place.115 For instance, suppose that a semiconductor manufacturer 
holds a patent on a valuable computer chip. The patent, however, is plausibly invalid—the chip 
is too similar to one that preceded it. It would be socially productive if another semiconductor 
firm were to challenge the patent and attempt to invalidate it because the price of the chip would 
fall if the challenge were successful. But it might not be worthwhile for another manufacturer to 
do so. That firm would bear the full cost of the challenge, including the damages it would have to 
pay if it were found to be infringing. But it would capture only a fraction of the value of 
invalidating the patent. The original manufacturer would still control part of the market, and 
other semiconductor firms that did not participate in the lawsuit could swoop in and capture 
market share as well. The challenger would be largely providing a benefit to other parties. This is 
why there are likely too few patent challenges over all. It makes little sense to impose additional 
taxes on patent challengers and potentially further dissuade them from producing such public 
goods. 
                                                 
112 See Robert D. Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4–5 
(1985). Criminal penalties are an exception. Defendants pay fines to the state rather than to the victim of their 
crimes. See, e.g., Andrew M. Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 Mich. L. Re. 1699, 1704 (1987).  
113 Public goods are goods that are non-rival, in that no one can be excluded from using or enjoying them. The 
invalidation of a bad patent creates a public good in that any competitor to the patent holder, not just the party that 
invalidated the patent, can now enter the market. For a general discussion of public goods, see HARVEY S. ROSEN, 
PUBLIC FINANCE 61 (5th ed. 1999). 
114 See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 688 (2004) (“A court judgment that a patent claim is invalid is a public good.”). 
115 See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 114 
(2006) (“[E]ven invalid patents can create unacceptable litigation risks for potential entrants, raise entry costs, delay 
entry, deter customers and business partners from contracting with new entrants, and impose inefficiencies while 
distorting innovation.”). 
  
Another possibility is paying for the additional rewards out of general tax revenues. The 
government could provide a direct monetary award as part of the remedies phase of the litigation. 
This would avoid distortions in the behavior of potential patent challengers. However, we think a 
superior solution would be for future consumers of the innovative firm’s products to pay for 
these rewards. The reason is fairness—or at least distributional neutrality. The reason for 
creating supplemental rewards is to eliminate the disincentive for future innovation imposed by 
non-meritorious litigation. The beneficiaries of this future innovation are the future consumers of 
the firm’s products. Thus, it is more fair—and there is less needless redistribution of wealth—if 
future consumers pay for these supplemental rewards.  
The more difficult question is how to identify and collect from these future consumers. It is, 
of course, impossible to know precisely who will purchase a firm’s products in the future. But 
the firm’s current consumers (or those people who will be purchasers in the near future) might 
serve as a reasonable proxy. Individuals who are purchasing Apple products today are probably 
most likely to purchase them in the future; individuals (or businesses) who buy one Dell 
computer are more likely to purchase another Dell computer; and so forth.116 The government 
could conceivably impose a special tax on current or future purchases of a firm’s products, with 
that tax being paid directly to the firm. But this would be counterproductive. It would amount to 
a state-imposed price hike on a firm’s goods, which would presumably decrease the quantities of 
those goods sold. It is safe to assume that each firm is pricing its own goods so as to maximize 
profits—or, at least, that the firm is better at doing so than the government would be.117 Most 
firms would simply lower their prices, returning the overall price of the product to its prior level. 
A separate tax, even one paid directly to the firm, would not be an improvement. 
A better solution is to extend the terms of the patents at suit.118 Consider a change in the law 
that allowed courts to award additional years at the end of a patent term any time a patent holder 
won a lawsuit for infringement of that patent. The firm would garner further monopoly profits 
from this extended term, providing additional rewards for its innovation. These rewards would 
be paid for by consumers who purchase that firm’s products in the near future—again, a 
reasonable proxy for those consumers who will purchase future products made by the same 
firm.119 
It would not be difficult for a court (or Congress) to properly price the size of this 
supplemental reward. Recall that the supplemental reward should equal ( . 
                                                 
116 Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 1455, 1462–63 (2002) (arguing that patents and trademarks can be used to increase the power of brand loyalty 
and its profitability). 
117 See, e.g., Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 168, 179 (2002) (explaining that the common effects of price controls are “queuing, unsatisfied demand, and 
an illegal market . . . .”). 
118 A patent is valid for twenty years from the date the patent application was first filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) 
(2006). 
119 Of course, if the victorious patent holder is not a commercial firm but instead a non-practicing entity that makes 
profits through patent royalties, it would be the losing firm’s customers, rather than the winning firm’s customers, 
who would foot the bill. If the patent was truly novel and innovative and was effectively expropriated by the 
defendant, this arrangement would be appropriate. But if the patent is not novel and valuable, it presents a problem. 
Section IV offers a brief sketch of a solution.  
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The  term represents the potential loss of patent term length if that patent is improperly 
invalidated at trial. If the value of a patent over its lifespan is approximately constant, a court 
should just extend a patent’s term by —the ratio of transaction costs to the 
annual value of the patent, plus the number of valuable years of the patent term put at risk at trial 
discounted by the probability that the patent could have been mistakenly invalidated. If litigation 
costs are small relative to annual profits from a patent—that is, if —one could ignore the 
 term.120 This would eliminate any need to calculate precisely the average yearly value of the 
patent, which a court would have to undertake if it were awarding supplemental monetary 
damages. The fact that it is the patent itself that is being extended renders this accounting 
unnecessary. Imagine, for instance, that a patent holder wins an infringement lawsuit based on 
conduct that began fourteen years after the patent at suit was granted. Six years remain on the 
patent term. Suppose that the court estimates that the error rate in such cases involving valid 
patents is 20%.121 In addition to the usual remedies, the court would extend the patent’s term by 
an additional 0.84 years, or approximately 10 months.122 There could also be a small additional 
adjustment ( ) for the fixed cost  of the patent litigation even if .123 
The potential downside of extending the patent term—as opposed to simply paying the 
patentee from general tax revenues—is that it could lead to increased deadweight economic 
losses. As we explained above, the virtue of a patent is that it provides the patentee with a limited 
monopoly over a good, allowing the patentee to charge monopolistic prices (rather than 
competitive prices). These higher prices incentivize further research and innovation, but they are 
also conventionally thought to price some consumers out of the market. When a consumer who 
would have purchased the good at a competitive price cannot afford it at its monopoly price, 
there is a resulting deadweight loss in the form of diminished consumer welfare.124 
This is an important consideration, though it may well be outweighed by the other 
advantages of extending the patent term. The main case for a twenty-year patent is that the 
innovative effects from exclusivity of that duration exceeds the deadweight loss from that 
exclusivity. That argument is typically made while ignoring the litigation costs from patent 
challenges and assuming no court errors when challenges are litigated. Our patent extension and 
                                                 
120 For evidence that suggests litigation costs are often substantially lower than annual profits, see infra text 
accompanying note 64. 
121 It may be substantially overoptimistic to think that a court could properly estimate the probability of its own (or 
the jury’s) error. Accordingly, it would probably be best if Congress set this probability by legislation. 
122 (20 year patent term – 14 years elapsed) × 0.2 × (1 – 0.4) = 0.84 years = 10.08 months. 
123 Calculation of this additional adjustment will necessarily be more crude, as the variance in patent values—and 
thus the variance in the value of additional term length—far exceeds the variance in the cost of patent litigation. 
Some victorious patent holders will inevitably be paid too much; some will be paid too little. However, in many 
cases, and for many valuable patents—the ones that will be litigated most frequently—  will be much smaller than 
v. Accordingly, it will be unnecessary to calculate this additional quantity. 
124 See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard 
Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 662 (2010). 
  
penalties are designed to return the period of exclusivity to the balance that would be achieved 
under a twenty-year patent without challenges. Moreover, it is possible that the conventional 
belief that patents lead to monopoly prices and deadweight losses is overstated. In separate work, 
we have argued that creative pricing mechanisms can eliminate the deadweight loss associated 
with patents by ensuring that no (or very few) consumers are priced out of the market for 
patented goods.125 We further demonstrate that these pricing mechanisms are in use across a 
broad spectrum of industries.126 If we are correct, the case against patent term extensions 
dissipates substantially. 
A second concern with our approach is that it relies upon a questionable assumption: that the 
value of a patent is approximately constant over time. If a patent declines in value over time, 
additional years after the end of the typical patent term will be insufficient to compensate the 
patent holder for the risk of losing earlier years before the end of the patent’s life. In the limiting 
case, a patent may even be worthless by the end of its life. This assumption of constant patent 
value is fairly conservative for pharmaceuticals and for many types of medical devices, which 
sell for a higher price and at higher quantities at the end of their life than they do at the 
beginning127 due to advertising.128 But it does not hold true for most semiconductor and 
computer patents, which are generally valueless after four or five years as they are outpaced by 
advances in technology.129 Accordingly, in designing supplemental remedies it might be 
necessary to draw distinctions among industries. Owners of pharmaceutical patents would 
receive an additional patent-term length, while owners of computer-related patents would receive 
direct monetary payments from the government. We do not pause to dwell on the specifics of 
this proposal here but instead explore the idea of industry-specific treatment in greater detail in 
Part IV. In addition, in that Part we suggest modifications to the proposal for supplemental 
remedies that may obviate the particular issue of whether to grant additional term length or 
supplemental money damages. 
 
2.  Victorious Patent Challenger 
 
As we explained above, there will generally be too few patent challenges because patent 
challengers cannot fully internalize the benefits of their success. In order to incentivize greater 
numbers of patent challenges, it makes sense to offer additional rewards or bounties to patent 
challengers who succeed in court. Accordingly, when a patent challenger prevails and forces a 
patent owner to pay heightened penalties, those penalties should be paid to the patent challenger. 
The Hatch–Waxman Act accomplishes this in the context of pharmaceutical patents by offering 
                                                 
125 See Anup Malani & Jonathan Masur, Two-Part Pricing and the Cost of Patents (2012) (unpublished manuscript 
on file with authors).  
126 Id. 
127 Jayanta Bhattacharya & William B. Vogt, A Simple Model of Pharmaceutical Price Dynamics, 46 J.L & ECON. 
599 (2003); Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. 
& MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 86 (1997); Henry. G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price 
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L & ECON. 331 (1992). 
128 Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An Analysis of 
Pharmaceutical Markets, 55 J.L & ECON. 151 (2012). 
129 See Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent 
Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804, 808 (2004) (describing the life cycle of high-tech patents). 
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successful patent challengers 180 days of market exclusivity.130 In effect, we are suggesting a 
Hatch–Waxman-type rule for every type of patent. 
In addition to the positive incentive effects, forcing defeated patent owners to pay enhanced 
penalties to victorious challengers would have valuable distributional effects. When a patent 
owner asserts an invalid patent, it is the competitor—the patent challenger—who stands to be 
harmed most directly. The invalid patent functions as a mechanism for taxing the genuine 
innovation in which the competitor has engaged. This in turn harms consumers of the patent 
challenger’s products, who are forced to pay higher prices because of this tax. The enhanced 
penalties paid to patent challengers would compensate them, in the aggregate, for the risk that 
they will be unfairly taxed at trial. As the costs of innovation decrease, so too will the prices of 
patent challengers’ goods. The end beneficiaries will be the consumers who have been 
shouldering the costs of unmeritorious litigation all along.  
 
D.  RELATED APPROACHES 
 
1.  The English Rule 
 
The solution we offer above bears a family resemblance to a more pedigreed legal 
mechanism: the “loser pays” or “English Rule.” In jurisdictions that have adopted the English 
Rule, the losing party in litigation must pay the prevailing party’s costs and attorneys’ fees.131 If 
courts and juries in patent cases are accurate most of the time, then applying the English Rule 
should be generally beneficial: holders of strong patents would see their rewards increase, and 
holders of weak patents would see theirs diminish. Yet we do not believe that it would be 
appropriate to straightforwardly apply the English Rule in patent cases. 
There is an extensive literature on the advantages and disadvantages of the English Rule, in 
comparison to the standard American Rule in which both sides bear their own costs,132 and we 
will not recapitulate that literature here.133 It suffices to note three particular reasons why we do 
not believe that the English Rule is advisable or adequate. First, it is well understood that the 
English Rule can cause distortions in litigation behavior by encouraging litigants to increase their 
                                                 
130 See Hemphill, supra note 47, at 1561–67 (2006) (describing in detail the operation of the Hatch–Waxman Act). 
The Hatch–Waxman Act has several design flaws that make it subject to substantial abuse, see id. at 1571–72, but 
those flaws do not affect the system of enhanced penalties described here. 
131 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 
(1982) (“The English routinely include an assessment for a reasonable attorney’s fee in the costs to be borne by a 
losing party . . . .”). 
132 Id. (“With its general rule that each side in civil litigation has ultimate responsibility for its own lawyer’s fees and 
that the system will not require the loser to pay anything toward the winner’s representation, this country stands in a 
small minority among the industrialized democracies.”). 
133 For a sampling of that literature, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: 
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 896 (1987) (explaining that 
“under the English rule, the interests of attorney and client often can differ: the attorney may want to prosecute a 
weak or marginal case in order to earn a fee even when the client—who would be liable for the fees of both sides if 
the action were unsuccessful—would not.”); Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule 
Really Cheaper?, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143 (1987); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: 
The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993). 
  
litigation expenditures, figuring that their opponents will eventually have to pay.134 The greater 
the differential in resources between the two sides, the greater the distortions: a wealthy litigant 
can threaten to effectively bankrupt a poorer opponent in the event of victory.135 This is 
especially important in the context of patent disputes between small start-up companies and large 
commercial firms, which we described in Part II above. There, the problem is that litigation costs 
are relatively minor for the large commercial entity but enormous for the much smaller firm, 
impinging on the smaller firm’s ability to effectively defend its patents. Forcing the smaller firm 
to account for the risk of bearing the larger firm’s costs would only exacerbate this problem. 
One partial solution might be to institute an “infringer-pays” rule, rather than the neutral 
English Rule. Under such a rule, a defendant held liable for infringement would pay the 
plaintiff’s costs and fees, but a defeated plaintiff would not be responsible for the defendant’s 
fees.136 This would shield plaintiff start-up companies from huge losses in the event that they 
were defeated by larger competitors. However, it would not solve the correlative problem of 
larger firms using their extensive portfolios to threaten smaller competitors who possess valuable 
patents.137 If those threats became litigation, the smaller firms would still be at risk of financial 
ruin in the event that they lost. Of course, a finding that the small firm had infringed the larger 
firm’s patents might have exactly the same effect, making the addition of attorneys’ fees 
irrelevant. Accordingly, an infringer-pays rule might be preferable.138 
Yet this in turn raises the second problem with the English Rule, which is that it could 
unreasonably diminish incentives to bring patent challenges, including worthwhile challenges to 
invalid patents.139 As we explained above, worthwhile patent challenges produce public goods.140 
Consequently, there are generally fewer patent challenges than would be optimal. The English 
Rule would exacerbate this problem by increasing the penalties for unsuccessful patent 
challenges, further dissuading potential challengers from litigating. It is for this reason that we 
advocate paying successful patent owners through patent extensions, rather than forcing patent 
challengers to shoulder the cost. One could imagine instead instituting a “plaintiff pays” rule, in 
which only unsuccessful patent plaintiffs must shoulder the other side’s costs. But this would 
merely return to the problems described in the paragraphs above. 
                                                 
134 See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989) (summarizing literature on the English Rule and cost-increasing behavior). 
135 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Reconciling Incentives 
to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1871 (1998) (detailing the wealth differential, but also noting 
that in the extreme case the effect may be reversed by the presence of a judgment-proof party). 
136 An analogous rule in federal constitutional litigation is that parties that prevail on constitutional claims against a 
state or local government actor receive attorney’s fees, while those that lose do not have to pay the government’s 
fees for defending against those claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006) (awarding reasonable attorney fees to parties 
prevailing in §1983 actions). 
137 See supra sections II.A.3 & II.B.2. 
138 Another potential wrinkle is an exception to the English Rule for small firms. This would eliminate the 
possibility that a larger commercial entity could drive a small startup out of business simply by running up litigation 
costs. Nonetheless, we do not believe that is the paramount concern, as we explained above. A finding that a small 
startup has infringed a larger firm’s patents will likely have the same effect. This wrinkle also would not solve the 
problem described below. 
139 See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Study On Paths to a “Better Way”: Litigation, Alternatives, and 
Accommodation: Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 888 (1989) (describing the incentive effects of the 
English Rule). 
140 See supra section III.C. 
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It is additionally worth noting that at the time of this writing, a bill has been introduced in the 
House of Representatives that would establish a similarly asymmetric fee-shifting rule. The 
“Shield Act” would allow courts to order patent plaintiffs to pay alleged infringers’ attorneys’ 
fees—“upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the patent did not 
have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding.”141 The bill is incomplete and flawed as currently 
written. It would do nothing to compensate holders of valuable patents for the risk that their 
patents might be erroneously overturned, and in fact it would only reduce the value of those 
patents further. But it nonetheless represents a promising step in the right direction. 
None of these formulations of the fee-shifting rule eliminates the third shortcoming of that 
approach, which is that litigation costs constitute an extremely small fraction of the potential lost 
value of a patent in the event of an erroneous judicial decision. Holders of valuable patents face 
two sorts of costs when they become targets: litigation costs and costs associated with the 
possibility that a patent will be mistakenly held invalid (or not infringed). The former cost is not 
insignificant, but it can be dwarfed by the latter. The average patent case that is litigated to final 
judgment costs each side on the order of $5 million.142 Yet a single patent—particularly a patent 
on a successful pharmaceutical—could be worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars 
per year. Consider a patent valued at $500 million that is 10% likely to be invalidated at trial. 
Each time that patent’s owner goes to trial, the litigation costs represent less than 10% of the 
total expected loss that litigation presents.143 The English Rule, standing alone, is thus far from a 
full solution. 
 
2.  Insurance Claims and Fraud 
 
To the best of our knowledge there is no legal system that formally replicates the structure of 
enhanced rewards and penalties that we have described here. However, a rough facsimile has 
developed in the field of insurance law.144 If an insurance claimant files a fraudulent claim, she 
runs the risk of not only having that claim denied but in addition facing criminal penalties for 
insurance fraud.145 On the other hand, if an insurance claimant files a valid claim and the insurer 
unreasonably or fraudulently denies the claim, the claimant can in some cases collect punitive 
damages from the insurance company.146 Insurance law thus functions as a two-sided system of 
enhanced rewards and penalties, at least in extreme cases. We can think of the insurance 
claimant as standing in the shoes of the patent holder, and the insurance company in the role of 
the alleged infringer. 
There is a potential concern that the possibility of enhanced rewards—punitive damages for 
fraudulent denial of an insurance claim—could lead insured parties to sandbag their insurers. The 
insured would withhold key information in an attempt to induce the insurer to deny the claim, 
and then deploy that information in order to convince a court that the insurer’s actions had been 
                                                 
141 The Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2012, H.R. 6245, 112th 
Cong. § 2(a). 
142 See sources cited in supra note 64. 
143 The cost to the patent holder in terms of the risk that the patent will be invalidated is $500 million x 10% = $50 
million. If the litigation costs another $5 million, the total cost is $55 million, of which the litigation cost accounts 
for 9%. 
144 We thank Todd Henderson for suggesting this point. 
145 See, e.g., United States v. Irons, 53 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 1995). 
146 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 413–15 (2003). 
  
fraudulent. A system of enhanced rewards and penalties could conceivably become 
counterproductive if such behavior migrated to patent law. 
To the extent that this concern even exists in insurance law,147 we do not believe that it would 
be present in patent law. The premise behind such chicanery is that insured parties possess 
private information about their claims or themselves. It is this private information that they are 
able to first withhold and then deploy. But patentees possess no such private information: the 
patent, its prosecution history, and all relevant prior art are all public. There is nothing for the 
patentee to withhold, and thus no opportunity for such strategic behavior.148  
 
* * * 
 
If verdicts in patent cases tend to be inaccurate, it would seem misguided to suggest raising 
the stakes of those cases. But that is precisely what we propose here. Providing enhanced 
rewards for patent owners who succeed at trial and enhanced penalties for owners who fail 
would force owners of valid and invalid patents to self-sort. Owners of valid, valuable patents 
would realize greater rewards from asserting those patents, and thus greater incentives to 
innovate in the first instance. Owners of invalid patents would have substantially less to gain at 
trial, and thus less ability to extract rents from genuine innovators. Such a system of heightened 
rewards and penalties would have substantial salutary effects, even if courts never became more 
accurate.  
 
IV.  REFINEMENTS AND CAVEATS 
 
So far we have laid out the basic theory behind our proposal for raising the stakes in patent 
cases. As we have explained, policymakers need not estimate courts’ error rates precisely or 
calculate reward and penalty multipliers perfectly for our proposal to improve the patent system. 
All that is necessary is (1) that courts and parties are more than 50% accurate—that is, better 
than a coin flip; and (2) that the supplemental penalties and rewards are greater than zero. So 
long as these two conditions are met, any implementation would represent an improvement from 
the status quo. 
But policymakers could in fact do much better if they so chose. In the sections that follow, 
we highlight a number of refinements that would enhance the effectiveness of our proposal in 
substantial ways. We also address a number of potential problems with such a system and 
provide workable solutions. First, we describe how policymakers could tailor a system of 
enhanced rewards and benefits to particular inventive industries, applying enhanced rewards in 
                                                 
147 Insurance law has mechanisms to deal with this type of problem, such as the fact that the cause of action requires 
that the insurer have acted in bad faith.  
 
To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying 
benefits of the policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a 
reasonable basis for denying the claim. It is apparent, then, that the tort of bad faith is an 
intentional one.  
 
Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978). 
148 Of course, the patentee could refrain from publicizing the very existence of the patent. But this is precisely what 
patentees are already doing. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 471 
(2004). 
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industries where patents are generally valuable and the risk of erroneous invalidation is highest, 
and enhanced penalties in industries characterized by excessive patenting and patent holdup. We 
then discuss how our proposal might be implemented, and by which institutional actors. We 
analyze the effects of enhanced rewards and penalties on settlement behavior. And we close by 
addressing the problems that arise if patent plaintiffs are judgment-proof.  
 
A. INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC TREATMENT 
 
The system of enhanced rewards and penalties that we propose will effectively separate 
holders of valid and invalid patents by adjusting their incentives at trial. But it might be possible 
to increase the specificity and precision of this system by applying it piecemeal. Certain types of 
lawsuits would be eligible for enhanced rewards but not penalties; other types of lawsuits could 
be opened to enhanced penalties but not rewards.  
For instance, consider the role of non-practicing entities (NPEs). These are firms that do not 
actually produce or market any product or service, and often do no research, either. Instead, they 
simply own patents and use those patents to secure licensing fees or litigation judgments against 
productive commercial firms. It might be possible to take advantage of the fact that NPEs file a 
disproportionate share of the lawsuits in which invalid patents are asserted.149 That is to say, a 
lawsuit brought by an NPE is more likely to involve an overbroad or invalid patent, or one that 
contributed no useful innovation, than a lawsuit brought by a commercial firm. If the goal is to 
avoid benefitting holders of these sorts of patents, NPEs should be separated from other types of 
patent plaintiffs. 
The most direct method for accomplishing this would be to not award enhanced rewards to 
any patent plaintiff that has not produced a product in the technological area covered by its 
patent in suit. One could even imagine very particular tests, such as: plaintiffs will not be eligible 
for enhanced remedies unless they have made $X million in sales of a product covered by the 
patent at suit. 
There are a number of problems with this approach. The first is that it would disadvantage 
small start-up companies and other firms that might eventually become commercial entities but 
have not yet produced products. (It also might be seen as an invitation to infringe patents that 
have simply not yet been commercialized.) However, this will be an issue with any sorting 
mechanism based around whether or not a firm is an NPE. A firm’s NPE status is not a perfect 
proxy for the true variable of interest—whether the firm is asserting an invalid or overbroad 
patent. Using it as a proxy will inevitably lead to errors of over-inclusion (start-up firms) and 
under-inclusion (commercial firms asserting invalid patents). 
The larger flaw with this sorting mechanism is that it would incentivize firms to evade it by 
simply transferring their patents to other companies. Consider a true patent troll, P, a firm that 
exists only to hold patents and assert them against commercial entities. Imagine that it holds a 
patent that could plausibly cover a product produced by both Firm A and Firm B, two large 
commercial firms. Under this rule, P could not obtain enhanced remedies against either Firm A 
or Firm B. Instead, it could choose to sell the patent to Firm A. Firm A would be willing to pay P 
the expected value of P’s suit against Firm A, plus the expected value of Firm A’s potential suit 
against Firm B. The expected value of that suit would involve enhanced remedies, because Firm 
                                                 
149 Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1583, 1602 (2009) (describing the role of non-practicing entities and the types of lawsuits they initiate). 
  
A manufactures a product covered by the patent. P would have enhanced the value of its property 
right simply by transferring it to a different type of party.150 Not only would this frustrate the 
purpose of a rule excluding NPEs from accessing enhanced patent remedies, it would also create 
incentives for firms to expend resources on transfers of intellectual property rights that create no 
social wealth whatsoever but produce transaction costs. 
This concern is mitigated somewhat by the rarity of large commercial competitors litigating 
infringement suits against one another to judgment.151 The reason is that they have too much to 
lose: in many cases, each firm holds a substantial portfolio of patents that the other firm is 
plausibly infringing.152 If one firm were to file suit, it would risk a countersuit that could be just 
as damaging.153 Both firms would expend millions of dollars in litigation costs without gaining a 
clear advantage. For this reason, larger commercial firms typically prefer to enter into cross-
licensing agreements with one another, rather than litigating to judgment.154 In addition, the 
patents held by trolls may be duplicative of patents already held by these large commercial 
firms—particularly when it comes to devices that are covered by hundreds or even thousands of 
patents.155 In the hands of a major commercial firm, one additional patent may confer little 
additional value. Nonetheless, it is always possible that a patent troll would be able to find a 
higher value commercial buyer for its patents, resulting in wasteful transactions and evasion of 
the limits on heightened remedies. 
In light of this, an industry-focused approach might be superior. This approach takes 
advantage of the fact that certain industries and areas of technology are characterized by 
substantial activity by NPEs and patent trolls, and others are not. One could consider awarding 
enhanced rewards only to victorious patent plaintiffs who hold patents in industries and technical 
fields that do not involve significant activity by trolls: pharmaceutical drugs, biotechnology, 
medical devices, chemicals, optics, machinery, and the like.156 Victorious plaintiffs in industries 
with significant activity by patent trolls—software, computers, electronics, semiconductors, and 
similar fields—would be denied access to these enhanced remedies. In symmetric fashion, one 
could consider limiting the availability of enhanced penalties to industries with substantial troll 
activity. 
                                                 
150 Firm A and P would presumably split the value of the enhanced remedies between them, according to their 
relative bargaining power. This would mean that part of the “tax” being paid by Firm B would go to Firm A, where it 
might well be redirected towards valuable research. A smaller share would go to P as a true tax on valuable 
innovation. This makes this particular solution somewhat more appealing. 
151 This is not to say that large firms do not file suit against one another. See Chien, supra note 80, at 1572 (“I found 
that public and large private companies initiated 42% of all lawsuits studied, 28% of the time against other large 
companies . . . .”). The difference is that monetary awards are rarely the outcome or the objective of large-firm 
litigation. See infra  notes 152-54 and accompanying text.  
152 See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for 
the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 299 (2010). 
153 Id. (“To guard against the risk of patent litigation, companies acquire patents so they can retaliate against or 
neutralize threats of suits brought by their competitors.”). 
154 See id. at 307–10. 
155 See, e.g., David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG, 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html (Aug. 3, 2011) (“A smartphone might 
involve as many as 250,000 (largely questionable) patent claims, and our competitors want to impose a ‘tax’ for 
these dubious patents that makes Android devices more expensive for consumers.”). 
156 See, e.g., Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of 
Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 689, 693 (2006) (“Large biotechnology, medical, and pharmaceutical 
companies (biotech/pharma) do not face the same threat that their info-tech counterparts face.”).  
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This proposal draws upon a literature suggesting that courts are already creating different 
patent rules for different industries157 and recommending that Congress or the PTO do the same 
even more explicitly.158 There is also a direct analogy to the Supreme Court’s approach to 
injunctive remedies in eBay v. MercExchange. There, several concurring justices noted that not 
all industries, and not all patent plaintiffs, are equivalent.159 Where there is an especially high 
risk of patent holdup, or where there is reason to believe that the plaintiff’s assertion of its patent 
rights will hinder rather than promote innovation, the Court hinted that it disfavored injunctive 
relief.160 To date, these types of industry-by-industry adjustments have been made largely by the 
courts,161 though Congress162 and the PTO have intervened on very limited occasions.163 It may 
be appropriate for the courts to take the lead again here, or it might be advantageous for 
Congress or an administrative agency to play a significant role. The institutional details are 
interesting and important but beyond the scope of this Article. What is important is that industry-
by-industry distinctions such as the one we are proposing are hardly foreign to patent law. 
Could this arrangement similarly be gamed by opportunistic patent trolls? One option would 
be for trolls to simply cease activity in a given industry, goading courts into offering enhanced 
remedies, before resuming litigious activities. Yet this is highly improbable for any number of 
reasons. If trolls could convince courts to allow enhanced remedies by ceasing activity, courts 
would presumably turn the spigot back off once trolls resumed litigating. Patent trolls would also 
cost themselves a tremendous amount of money by ceasing activity simply in order to tap into 
greater enhanced remedies at some future date. And patent trolls would also have to engage in a 
significant amount of concerted action (actually, nonaction) in order to implement this plan. This 
creates a severe collective action problem—any given patent troll would benefit enormously 
from defecting from an agreement and continuing to litigate. 
A more likely possibility is that trolls might migrate from the technical fields they currently 
inhabit to other industries (such as pharmaceuticals) where the remedies are more generous. If it 
became standard practice for patent trolls to “follow the money” in this fashion,164 any strategy 
that relied upon distinctions between industries would be quickly eroded. 
However, it is extremely difficult—if not impossible—for patent trolls to take up residence 
within another industry or technical field. The reason has nothing to do with the expertise within 
those firms, or the types of patents owned by trolls. If those were the barriers, trolls could simply 
hire experts in other technical areas and purchase other patents. Rather, some industries are 
simply more conducive to predatory patent behavior than others. The reason appears to be that it 
is easier in some fields than in others to specify an invention for purposes of a patent. In the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries, for instance, a patentee can specify a drug or chemical 
                                                 
157 See generally id. 
158 See Masur, supra note 92, at 277. 
159 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An industry has 
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for 
obtaining licensing fees . . . .”). 
160 Id. at 396–97  (“When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to 
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may 
well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”). 
161 See  DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 8–11 (2009). 
162 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2006). 
163 See Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
164 See Memorable Quotes For All the President’s Men, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0074119/quotes (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
  
with a great deal of precision by describing the molecule involved. Any given invention is 
usually covered by only a small number of significant patents165—hence the often-stated 
principle of “one molecule, one patent.”166 Consequently, old patents can rarely be re-interpreted 
in broad fashion to cover new inventions. The opportunities for trolls are greatly limited. It is for 
this reason that these industries—and others, such as machinery and optics—are not generally 
thought to have many trolls currently operating. If trolls could gain a foothold litigating in these 
fields, they would already have done so; there is no reason for them to have artificially confined 
their activity to certain industries. The relative absence of troll-like behavior is therefore best 
understood as a function of the way in which patents interact with and describe the relevant 
technology. 
Accordingly, we believe that it will be possible to obtain the advantages of enhanced 
remedies while minimizing the harm done by patent trolls by limiting these enhanced remedies 
by industry. There will be some definitional issues at the margins—parties may argue over 
whether a particular patent covers computers or machinery, for instance—but these are the types 
of issues that courts are well-equipped to decide.167 The distinctions we seek to draw are 
necessarily crude, but here these crude distinctions may function better than either finer 
distinctions, which can be gamed, or the status quo. 
 
B. IMPLEMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT 
 
The proposal we have described is not one that could be easily implemented by courts under 
current law. To begin with, there is no provision in law that would allow courts to assess the 
types of enhanced rewards and penalties that we advocate. The Patent Act permits courts to 
“increase the damages [found by a jury] up to three times the amount found or assessed,”168 and 
courts have employed this provision to assess treble damages in cases of “willful” 
infringement.169 The Patent Act also permits courts to award attorneys’ fees in “exceptional 
cases.”170 Importantly, however, both provisions only allow courts to increase the amount paid 
by the defendant to the plaintiff. There is no law that would enable courts to award heightened 
damages paid out of public funds, and no mechanism for penalizing patent plaintiffs who bring 
unmeritorious suits.171 
                                                 
165 A drug might have multiple patents on the form in which it is delivered or the dosage rate, but only one patent on 
the underlying molecular form. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards 
(and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 150 (2007) (“In particular, the one central fact about the information 
technology (“IT”) sector—including the Internet, semiconductors, telecommunications, computer hardware, and 
computer software—is the multiplicity of patents that developers must deal with. This is not a problem 
pharmaceutical companies generally encounter.”).  
166 Id. 
167 For that matter, the PTO classifies every patent by technology area as a matter of course. It does so in order to 
assign patent applications to the proper examiners when they are filed. If courts prove incapable of drawing 
consistent and meaningful distinctions between technological fields, the PTO might prove to be a worthy substitute. 
See Masur, supra note 92, at 312. 
168 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
169 See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Absent a statutory guide, we have 
held that an award of enhanced damages requires a showing of willful infringement.”).  
170 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
171 The closest available legal remedy is Rule 11 sanctions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). Yet Rule 11 sanctions are 
typically quite small (in the thousands or tens of thousands of dollars), rather than the millions we suggest awarding 
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In addition, our proposal relies on determining the (approximate) accuracy of courts across 
patent cases. We have no illusion of courts’ ability to ascertain this figure themselves. The 
judges of a court do not have the time to scrutinize one another’s opinions for error, nor would 
they be eager to point out their colleagues’ errors even if they discovered them.172 
 Accordingly, legislative or administrative action will be necessary. Congress could 
implement such an arrangement by legislation, or (perhaps preferably) could delegate the task to 
an administrative agency.173 In either event, a panel of outside experts should be tasked with 
reviewing a random sample of completed patent cases and determining courts’ error rate. 
 
C. SETTLEMENT 
 
Thus far our discussion has focused on outcomes at trial, and we have only alluded to 
licensing and settlement negotiations. These negotiations make up a significant fraction of the 
economic activity surrounding patents, but our general neglect of them has been deliberate. The 
reason is simple: settlement and licensing occur in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.174 The 
more that a plaintiff and defendant believe the plaintiff will win at trial, the greater the amount 
they will settle for (in the event that they settle).175 The less the plaintiff has to gain at trial, the 
lower the settlement price.176 Accordingly, a system of enhanced rewards and penalties will 
increase the amount that owners of valid, valuable patents will earn in licensing negotiations and 
decrease the amount that owners of invalid patents will be able to extract. These changes in 
settlement outcomes will mirror the changes in expected trial outcomes.177 
Nor should a symmetric system of enhanced rewards and penalties affect the likelihood of 
settlement. Settlement is valuable because it allows both sides to avoid the substantial expense 
involved in litigating.178 When parties fail to settle, it is typically because they disagree on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
in enhanced penalties. Herbert Kritzer, Lawrence Marshall & Frances Kahn Zemans, Rule 11: Moving Beyond the 
Cosmic Anecdote, 75 Judicature 269, 270 (1992) (“The median sanction is $2,500--that is to say 50 per cent of 
monetary sanctions awarded were for less than $2,500. A full two-thirds of the sanction awards were for $5,000 or 
less.”); see also Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 105, 137 (1988) (“Furthermore, the typical sanction award is a relatively minimal amount and is usually 
imposed against an attorney, rather than his client.”). Moreover, Rule 11 sanctions are traditionally applied only in 
extraordinary circumstances, whereas we propose enhanced penalties in every case where a patent is found invalid. 
Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 397, 427 nn.95–96 
(2007) (noting that that the “imposition of [Rule 11] sanctions is rare” and courts have “typically reserved 
[sanctions] only for egregious cases”). 
172 See Richard A. Posner, HOW JUDGES THINK 123–35 (2008) (describing the value that judges place on 
collegiality). 
173 See Masur, supra note 92, at 279 (suggesting that the PTO be afforded general rulemaking authority). 
174 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 
YALE L. J. 950 (1979) (setting forth the seminal model of settlement bargaining); see also Robert Cooter et al., 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) 
(expanding on the Mnookin & Kornhauser model); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical 
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982) (same). 
175 Shavell, supra note 174, at 67. 
176 Id. 
177 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 174, at 971 (elaborating on this point). 
178 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
399, 418 (1973). 
  
likely outcome of the case.179 If either party has private information that leads her to believe that 
she is more likely to win, the two sides will not be able to come to an agreement.180 That is, the 
decision to litigate rather than settling is driven by differences in information. Here, the system 
of enhanced rewards and penalties introduces no private or asymmetric information. Both parties 
will have the same information regarding the multipliers used to calculate enhanced rewards and 
penalties, and both parties will be able to perform the same calculations to the same degree of 
accuracy. If the parties would be inclined to settle absent a system of enhanced rewards and 
penalties, the introduction of that system will not dissuade them.  
The one factor that could impact settlement is the proposal we outlined above for paying 
victorious patent plaintiffs from general tax revenues or via a patent term extension, rather than 
forcing losing defendants to pay. The reason is that this third-party payment to plaintiffs 
decouples plaintiffs’ and defendants’ incentives, making trial worth more to plaintiffs if they 
have valuable patents. Consider a simple numerical example. Suppose that a plaintiff is 80% 
likely to prevail at trial, damages in the case will be $100 million, and the cost of litigating will 
be $10 million for each side. Absent a system of enhanced rewards and penalties, plaintiff’s 
expected payoff from going to trial would be: 
 
$100	million	ൈ	0.8	–	$10	million	ൌ	$70	million.	
	
Defendant’s expected payoff from going to trial would be: 
 
–$100	million	ൈ	0.8	–	$10	million	ൌ	–$90	million.	
 
Plaintiff and defendant thus should be willing to settle for any amount between $70 million and 
$90 million. 
Now consider the effect of adding enhanced rewards and penalties equal to $10 million, with 
the reward coming via a patent term extension rather than from defendants. Plaintiff’s expected 
payoff from going to trial would be: 
 
$110 million ൈ	0.8	–	$10	million	ൈ	0.2	‐	$10	million	ൌ	$76	million.	
 
Note that the plaintiff obtains an additional $10 million if she wins (with probability 0.8), but 
loses $10 million if she loses (with probability 0.2). Defendant’s expected payoff from going to 
trial would be: 
 
–$100	million	ൈ	0.8	൅	$10	million	ൈ	0.2	–	$10	million	ൌ	$88	million.	
                                                 
179 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9–12 (1984). 
180 See id. at 9 (describing the role of differential beliefs in settlement). Note that in the text we only consider the 
case where there is symmetric uncertainty that leads to differential beliefs. We do not consider the case where one 
side has systematically better information. Even if one thought, for example, that the patent holder had better 
information on validity, the outcome of the settlement game depends on who is able to make a final take-it-or-leave-
it offer. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. OF ECON. 
404, 405, 414 (1984) (describing model in which the less informed party makes final offer); Jennifer F. Reinganum 
& Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557, 558–59 
(1986) (describing model in which the better informed party has ability to make final offer). We certainly do not 
know a priori who has that sort of bargaining power.  
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Whereas the plaintiff’s enhanced gain does not come from the defendant’s pocket, her loss 
does go to the defendant. Plaintiff and defendant would then be willing to settle only for any 
amount between $76 million and $88 million. The available bargaining range has shrunk from 
$20 million ($90 million – $70 million) to $12 million ($88 million – $76 million). This will 
decrease the likelihood of settlement.181 
The result will be fewer settlements on the whole and more patent trials. This would most 
likely increase social welfare with respect to invalid or dubious patents, because those patents 
will be invalidated at trial and cannot later be asserted against other alleged infringers. But it will 
decrease social welfare with respect to valid patents by forcing the parties to incur litigation costs 
that might otherwise have been avoided. The net effects will be ambiguous and will depend on 
the percentages of asserted patents that are valid and invalid. This might constitute an argument 
for eschewing the asymmetric mechanism we recommend in which plaintiffs pay enhanced 
penalties to patent challengers but are paid enhanced remedies by the public. 
The important point is that enhanced rewards and penalties will improve settlement outcomes 
for holders of valid patents and worsen them for holders of invalid patents. For instance, in the 
numerical example above, the midpoint of the bargaining range absent enhanced rewards and 
penalties is $80 million. That midpoint rises to $82 million once enhanced rewards and penalties 
are introduced. The salutary effects of enhanced rewards and penalties will persist irrespective of 
whether litigants settle their cases or proceed to trial. 
 
D. RISK AVERSION 
 
One concern with our proposal for enhanced rewards and penalties is that they increase the 
amount of litigation risk to which the patent holder and challenger are exposed. To the extent 
that these parties are risk averse,182 our proposal would appear to reduce these parties’ welfare. 
This is not a critical objection to our basic proposal because parties can insure against litigation 
risk by settling cases. In the basic settlement model we employed in the last section, a reduction 
in utility or corporate welfare due to risk aversion to larger litigation stakes operates just like a 
litigation cost—it reduces the patent holder’s gain from litigating and increases the patent 
challenger’s loss to litigating. The combined effect is to reduce the parties’ utility from going to 
trial, making settlement even more attractive. If the parties settle, they do not face the same 
litigation risk. 
Interestingly, risk aversion offsets part of the problem raised by the variant of our proposal 
that has enhanced rewards funded partly by taxpayers or future consumers. In the previous 
section we explained that this decoupling of enhanced rewards from defendant payments 
increases the amount that the plaintiff expects to obtain at trial more than it increases the amount 
that the defendant expects to pay at trial. Because the scope for settlement is proportional to the 
                                                 
181 See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2002); see also Samuel Issacharoff 
& George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 101 (1990) (“[I]t is 
natural—as well as customary in the legal and economic literature—to assume that the likelihood of settlement is 
positively related to the width of the settlement zone.”). 
182 Corporate parties may behave in a risk-averse fashion either because owners or managers are actually risk averse 
or because they face a risk that threatens a company’s existence. In general, smaller firms are more likely to behave 
in a risk averse fashion than larger firms, either because smaller firms have fewer and perhaps less-diversified 
owners or because any given level of risk is more likely to bankrupt a small firm than a big firm. 
  
amount that the defendant expects to pay above and beyond what the plaintiff expects to receive, 
decoupled enhanced rewards reduce the scope for settlement. For reasons we gave in the last 
paragraph, however, decoupled enhanced rewards also increase the plaintiff’s cost of litigation 
due to risk aversion. This reduces the payoff that patent holders can expect from trial, offsetting 
some of the increased return from decoupled enhanced rewards. The offset is not complete 
because the enhanced reward is similar to a strictly positive value lottery. Positive value 
lotteries—for example, heads you win $5 and tails you win $10—have positive value to both 
risk-averse and non-risk-averse individuals.  That is, both individuals would pay a positive 
amount to face the lottery, though the risk-averse individual would be willing to pay less than the 
non-risk-averse individual to face it. In summary, risk aversion reduces some (but not all) of the 
anticipated returns to enhanced rewards and penalties but also ameliorates some of the reduction 
in settlement rates caused by decoupled enhanced rewards. 
 
E. INSOLVENT PLAINTIFFS AND SHAM LAWSUITS 
 
We close with two relatively discrete but important issues. First, it is essential that patent 
plaintiffs have the capacity to pay enhanced penalties if they lose at trial. Patent plaintiffs could 
conceivably evade their responsibility for enhanced penalties by transferring their patents to 
under-funded shell corporations and then using those corporations to bring suit. If the suit failed, 
the corporation would not have the resources to pay the penalty judgment. 
This is a real problem but one that is easily addressed. Patent plaintiffs should be forced to 
either post a litigation bond or purchase insurance against being assessed an enhanced penalty.183 
The bond or insurance would be pegged to the damages demanded by the plaintiff: the greater 
the damages, the greater the bond or insurance. 
Second, and lastly, it is always possible that patent holders will take advantage of the 
prospect of supplemental rewards by arranging sham lawsuits, which they then win at trial. Sham 
suits present a real concern, but they are hardly unique to this context—patent law offers 
numerous opportunities for patent holders and challengers to gain advantages via sham 
lawsuits.184 As in other areas of patent law, they can be policed through other means, principally 
an examination of connections between the plaintiff and defendant in a given suit and the parties 
with economic interests on both sides of the case.185 The PTO has already begun to take steps in 
this direction.186 The threat of fraud thus does not provide an adequate basis for rejecting 
supplemental patent remedies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have documented how patent challenges, patent law’s ex post attempt to 
correct mistakes made by the PTO, can undermine the initial goals of patents. Because of 
                                                 
183 See generally Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1417 (2011) (describing the 
use of litigation bonds and similar instruments). 
184 See Timothy Denny Greene, “All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent Licensee Standing, 22 FED. CIR. 
BAR J. 1 (2012). 
185 Federal law already requires that any civil action be “prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 17. 
186 See Tony Dutra, Stakeholders at PTO Roundtable Recommend Reporting Real Party in Interest Changes Only, 
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mistakes in the selection of patents by challengers and errors by courts in determining which 
patents are valid, patent challenges can penalize valid patents, thereby discouraging innovation, 
and protect some invalid patents, sustaining deadweight loss and taxing true innovation. One 
solution to the problem is to make patent challengers and courts more accurate. Where that is 
difficult, we propose an alternative, counterintuitive solution: increase the stakes in patent 
challenges. We recommend that patent owners whose patents are upheld at trial be given a 
reward—in the form of a patent extension—on top of the damages they usually get in court. 
Similarly, patent owners whose patents are held invalid by a court should be forced to pay a 
penalty to patent challengers. This will increase the wedge between the payoffs of having a 
patent upheld in courts and having it struck down by a court. So long as courts are better than a 
coin flip at determining whether a patent is truly valid, this approach will reward holders of truly 
valid patents and punish holders of truly invalid patents. Courts need not be perfectly accurate 
for our solution to work. Indeed, the higher stakes are a substitute for more accuracy. 
Although our proposal seems bold, it is actually fairly narrow. Whereas we only use higher 
stakes to correct for skewed incentives created by imperfect patent challenges, higher stakes can 
also be used to correct for other flaws in the patent system, including the possibility that supra-
competitive profits from market exclusivity may not fully capture the full social gains from 
innovation187 or that market exclusivity may discourage follow-on innovation.188 In some sense, 
this is not at all surprising. Because the threat of damages awarded by court is ultimately how 
patent laws are enforced, those laws can be changed substantially by altering damages that courts 
award. 
Although manipulating the stakes in patent challenges can be used to tackle broader issues of 
patent policy, the choice between addressing the problem of imperfect challenges by increasing 
the accuracy of courts or by changing the patent approval process does not depend on the 
resolution of those underlying questions about patent policy. Whether one thinks that current 
patent law undercompensates for innovation or that its breadth deters future innovation, 
improvements in accuracy and increases in stakes will both address the problem. The point we 
wish to highlight is that increased accuracy and increased stakes are substitutes.  
Although we make our two basic observations—that litigation is mistake-prone and that 
higher stakes can correct some of that error—in the context of patent challenges, it also applies 
outside patent law. In general, it is important to model not just the incentive effects of a given 
legal rule but also the incentives to litigate that rule. Those litigation incentives can introduce 
errors into application of the basic legal rule, reducing the efficacy of the rule. Moreover, 
litigation errors can be corrected either by directly improving the accuracy of litigation or, 
surprisingly in some cases, by increasing the stakes in litigation. Increasing stakes is a plausible 
substitute for greater accuracy when litigants and courts, while not perfectly accurate, are at least 
better than random at identifying truly legal and illegal behavior. 
                                                 
187 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 1, at 529. 
188 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). 
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